Category Archives: In Our Opinion…

Civil Service Commission Clarifies Firefighter Seniority Rules For Layoffs

The Civil Service Commission issued a decision on August 6, 2009 that allows employers to count some prior non-fire service in calculating firefighter seniority in the event of a layoff.  The decision confirms two prior Commission decisions from the 1990s, both of which relied on a 1991 Attorney General opinion.  The case, Ponte, et al. v. City of Fall River, D1-09-155-158, arose after the City of Fall River laid off a number of firefighters in March 2009.  The City laid off the least senior firefighters, using a seniority list that counted prior service by current firefighters in other civil service positions in the City.  The four Appellants were laid off firefighters who had all served as firefighters with the Fall River Fire Department longer than four of the firefighters who were not laid off (“the retained firefighters”).  The Appellants claimed that the City erred when it counted prior service in other City departments in calculating seniority.  In fact, the Appellants argued, the four retained firefighters should have been laid off instead of them.  The retained firefighters were represented by John M. Becker, of Sandulli Grace, P.C.

            The legal arguments centered on the applicability of the last sentence of the fourth paragraph of General Laws, Chapter 31, Section 33: “In determining the seniority of a firefighter for the purpose of reduction in rank or reduction in force, his ranking shall be based on his length of service in the fire department in which such reduction is to take place.”  If the sentence applied, then the City was wrong to include service outside the fire department in calculating seniority for the layoffs.

            In a searching statutory analysis, Commissioner Paul Stein, writing for a unanimous Civil Service Commission, explored the language and history of Section 33 to conclude finally that the sentence did not apply.  Specifically, Commissioner Stein found that each paragraph of Section 33 referred to different scenarios and by placing the disputed sentence at the end of one of those paragraphs, instead of creating a new paragraph, the Legislature intended the sentence to apply only to the scenarios discussed in that paragraph.  Paragraph four discusses voluntary and involuntary transfers from one town or city to another, but service in other departments in the same city or town is discussed in paragraph three.  Therefore, the City was correct when it included service in other departments in the retained firefighters’ seniority.

            Commissioner Stein’s conclusion echoed that of a 1991 Attorney General Opinion, which had already been affirmed twice by the Commission in Maccarone et al. v. Lawrence Fire Dep’t, 4 MCSR 1105 (1991) and Smith v. Lawrence Fire Dep’t, 6 MCSR 35 (1993).  Ultimately, the Commission held, the Legislature must make any changes in the statute.

            In a subsidiary finding, Commissioner Stein interpreted the words of the dispute sentence “service in the fire department.”  Ruling against the Appellants, the Commission found that service as EMTs in the same fire department (which three of the four retained firefighters possessed) would be counted.  Commissioner Stein wrote, “If the intent was to calculate firefighter seniority solely on the basis of service as a firefighter, and not other service in any other division or departmental unit, the statutory language could easily have been modified to express that distinction.”

            In the end, the retained firefighters kept their jobs, and the Appellants remained laid off.  Commissioner Stein notes, however, that that Appellants and other laid off firefighters are continuing to challenge their layoffs before the Commission on other grounds.

 Link to Ponte case

Appeals Court Upholds Duty Of Fair Representation

Following the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board [http://socialaw.com/slip.htm?cid=19281&sid=119], union officials have been put on notice that what they don’t know can hurt their union.

 When the City of Springfield terminated a civil service public works employee, he had the option of either appealing to the Civil Service Commission or going to arbitration through his collective bargaining agreement (CBA).  This option was spelled out in the CBA and is also part of the collective bargaining law, Chapter 150E.

The union representative explained the option to the employee and advised him that the union would handle his arbitration case but that he would need to hire his own lawyer if he wanted to go to the Civil Service Commission.  The employee nevertheless expressed a preference for challenging his discharge through civil service, rather than arbitration.  What the union representative did not know or fully understand was that civil service appeals must be filed within ten (10) business days of the termination.

 Although the union representative went ahead and prepared to file the employee’s case for arbitration, when the employee again stated he preferred the civil service route, the representative withdrew the case and did not file for arbitration.  He did not check into nor inform the employee about the 10-day filing period, which had already passed a month before.  Both the Division of Labor Relations, and now the Appeals Court have concluded that the union’s actions here constituted “inexcusable neglect” in violation of the duty of fair representation.

 While this case does extend the degree to which public sector unions in Massachusetts are held liable for knowledge of laws outside their contract, it must serve as a warning to all unions, their staff, and even elected local union leaders.  When unions collect dues from and undertake to represent employees, they are going to be required to have some degree of knowledge about the laws covering their members.

The decision in this case points out that the union representative had access to union attorneys but did not utilize that resource.  For those of you in a position of union leadership, the message is clear: If you don’t know, ask!

The State Budgets To Drastically Reduce The State’s Quinn Bill Funding And Amends Language To Limit Eligibility – A Double Insult To Police Officers

We’ve known for months that the Commonwealth was considering a drastic cut to the Quinn Bill funding.  The FY2010 budget has now been signed by the Governor, and the State has appropriated only $10,000,000 to fund “its share” of Quinn Bill reimbursement, about an 80% cut.  Unfortunately, they saw fit to add insult to injury, also including language that will prevent officers from obtaining Quinn Benefits in the future. 

UNDERFUNDING

Underfunding of the Quinn can impact different departments differently, depending on how collective bargaining agreements treat Quinn.  The important thing to keep in mind is that the State “share” of Quinn funding is actually the State reimbursing a municipality for monies already expended.  What the State budget passed this week does is actually tell municipalities to anticipate that they will not be fully reimbursed in FY2010 for monies that they have already paid to officers for FY2009.  Under the Quinn statute, municipalities report how much they paid in the prior fiscal year to the Department of Education by September of the current year.  Thus, the request for FY09 reimbursement will not even be finalized until September, with the monies to be reimbursed in April or May of 2010.  Also, while the just passed budget would not cover the state’s full share of anticipated Quinn Bill reimbursement, at anytime between now and the end of FY2010 a supplemental appropriation could provide greater funding.  Therefore, it is premature for any city or town to be proposing reducing Quinn payments NOW based on the just passed FY2010 budget.

Even assuming that underfunding eventually occurs, unless your collective bargaining agreement provides for a reduction in a municipality’s Quinn Bill payments to officers in the case of the State not fully reimbursing, your city or town is still on the hook for paying the full statutory Quinn amount.  This is, again, because the Quinn Bill says that the officer will be paid the amounts, and the state will reimburse.  The problem with municipalities that are “on the hook” for the full statutory Quinn amount is that some claim to be considering trying to repeal the Quinn based on the possible underfunding.  Municipalities are emboldened to float such an idea based on the State taking the lead in undermining support for the Quinn bill.  This has gone so far that the Chiefs of Police have a legal advisory on their site regarding how to repeal the Quinn (This blows my mind, as the vast majority of Chiefs receive Quinn payments at a much higher level than police officers based on their much higher salaries).  It is IMPERATIVE that you keep us apprised of any efforts in your city or town to try to repeal the Quinn, and that you let us know immediately if something arises.

The projected underfunding of the Quinn in municipalities with contractual language for the city or town to be able to recoup Quinn payments because of the State budget presents a multitude of issues.  It should be noted that there is an argument to be made that any such language is unenforceable, as a collective bargaining agreement cannot technically trump the Quinn Bill statute.  However, this is an untested argument, and one that is difficult for a union to make – as the union agreed to the language.

With regards to contract language regarding Quinn, unfortunately there is no “one size fits all” answer for such municipalities, as the resolution of the issue is highly dependent on the specific language of the contract at issue.  It is highly advisable that you formulate a game plan with your parent union and/or counsel before you sit down with management to discuss the impact of possible underfunding.  For instance, in one town, the town agreed to address a past underfunding by officers surrendering earned comp time – no bargain, but at least an outcome that did not reduce paychecks.

CHANGES TO QUINN ELIGIBILITY

Again, once the State had Quinn benefits on the ground, it couldn’t help but administer a swift kick to the ribs via cutting off Quinn eligibility.  The budget language reads:

[A]ny current regular full-time member of a municipal police department who has not started accumulating points pursuant to said section 108L of said chapter 41 of the General Laws, as of September 1, 2009, shall not be eligible to participate in the career incentive pay program established pursuant to said section 108L of said chapter 41 of the General Laws…

 Based on this language, the $64,000 question is what does it mean to “start accumulating points” towards a Quinn Degree?  Does it mean that an officer has to actually have some credits towards an associate’s degree to qualify, or will it suffice that an officer has started taking classes by 9/1/09 in order to be eligible to eventually get a Quinn benefit?  This is not clear.  What is clear is that anyone who starts to pursue a degree after September 1 will not be eligible for Quinn.  As a result, 8 week credit courses in public safety starting today should be VERY well attended.

The only, and I mean ONLY, slightly good news is that Officers working towards a degree will be allowed to continue to progress towards a full Masters level Quinn.  The language is:

any current regular full-time member of a municipal police department who has begun to accumulate points pursuant to said section 108L of said chapter 41 of the General Laws as of September 1, 2009 shall be allowed to accumulate the maximum number of points permissible pursuant to said section 108L of said chapter 41 of the General Laws.

Thus, if you are on your way to an Associate’s degree, you will be able to receive Quinn benefits when you reach that level, and will be able to “move up the Quinn ladder” to a Bachelors and Masters degree.  How much you’ll get for those degrees, as noted above, remains unclear.

As always, we’ll keep you up to date with developments as they occur.  

HRD Gives Up On Banding, For Now

In case anyone hasn’t seen it, the following is now posted on the HRD web site:

2008 Police & Fire Promotional Exam Info Update

Due to the recent preliminary injunction issued by the Suffolk Superior Court in regard to the police promotional exams, the Human Resources Division (HRD) will not band scores for the October, 2008 promotional exams or the November, 2008 fire promotional exams. HRD is planning on moving forward with rulemaking for score banding in the future.

HRD has finally agreed to do what we asked them to do in the first place: not change the scoring system without changing their rules.

As always, we will keep you updated when we get more information.

Alan Shapiro

SJC Gives Public Employers New Tool For Blocking Disability Retirements

In a recent decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has allowed a public employer to block an injured employee’s attempt to retire on disability by modifying his work duties so that they no longer resemble his original core job duties.  The decision, Foresta v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, was issued on April 24, 2009 as 453 Mass. 669 and can be found here . Sandulli Grace, PC, filed a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, Inc. and the Massachusetts Coalition of Police, in support of the disability employee.

 Foresta involves an employee of the Mass. Turnpike Authority who sought a disability retirement after two job-related lower back injuries.  His job as safety inspector primarily involved driving around the state inspecting fire extinguishers.  A small portion of his job involved teaching courses and doing paperwork.  After Foresta suffered two on the job injuries, his doctors concluded that he was disabled from lifting the fire extinguishers, or driving for significant periods of time.  In other words, the work injuries prevented him from performing his essential job duties.  As a result of his disability, the Authority gave the fire extinguisher duties to another employee and assigned clerical/desk duties to Foresta, which used to be a minute function of his job.  Although a panel of doctors agreed that Foresta could not perform his core duties, it concluded that he could perform the duties of his new job. Foresta still sought a disability retirement, arguing that he was entitled to it because his job injuries prevented him from performing the essential functions of the job as it existed at the time of his injuries.

 The SJC disagreed with Foresta and instead ruled in favor of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority Employees’ Retirement Board’s decision to deny the accidental disability retirement application.  The SJC found that the Board’s denial was consistent with the history and purpose of the disability retirement laws.  In particular, those laws encourage employers to make accommodations for injured employees and provide rehabilitation for them to keep them on the job, which allegedly limits the Commonwealth’s liability and prevents possible abuses of the system.

 Foresta argued that anti-discrimination laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act only require employers to make reasonable accommodations, and changing the essential duties of the job is unreasonable.  The SJC ruled instead that the employer may make accommodations that go beyond its obligations under anti-discrimination law, as the Turnpike Authority did here.  Therefore, the SJC held, Foresta was not disabled if he could perform the essential duties of the job after the Turnpike Authority modified it into a desk job.  The bottom line of the SJC’s distinction between an employer’s rights and responsibilities under ADA and disability retirement law is that the public employer gets the final word on the employee’s employment– a public employer can deny a request to change the essential functions of the job when sought by an employee or applicant without violating the ADA, but the employer may force an injured employee to change the essential duties of his or her job in order to prevent him from leaving work on a disability retirement. 

 The SJC did place some limits on the changes that an employer may make to accommodate an injured employee.  “The essential duties of the job as modified must be similar in responsibility and purpose to those performed by the employee at the time of the injury, and must result in no loss of pay or other benefits,” the Court stated.  Presumably, then, there must be some continuity between the original job and the modified position in terms of duties performed.

 The SJC’s decision leaves a number of questions unanswered, notably, How will employers and retirement boards determine which duties are similar in responsibility and purpose to those the employee performed at the time of the injury?  What if other employees with the same job title performed the duties but the injured employee did not?   Does this case extend to light duty assignments for police and fire fighters, whose essential functions involve physically demanding crime and fire prevention/suppression?  Unfortunately, further litigation may be required to answer these and other questions that arise from the SJC’s vague language.  Only time will tell how severely public safety employees will be affected.  But there is no question that the right has been restricted by the Foresta decision: if a public employer wants to block an employee from getting a disability retirement – even where the disability results from the employee’s public service – the employer now has one more weapon in its arsenal.

 

 

Another Year, Another Successful MCOP Educational Seminar

On April 27, 2009, The Massachusetts Coalition of Police hosted its annual Police Educational Seminar for a packed audience in Westborough.  As in the past, the attorneys of Sandulli Grace, joined by outside experts, presented on a variety of timely legal topics.  Over the years, the annual seminar has become a premier educational event for Massachusetts police officers.

As usual, the topics this year were informative and timely.  (See the program here – See photos from the seminar here).  After a welcome from MCOP President Hugh Cameron and MCOP In House Counsel Tim King, Sandulli Grace Attorneys Susan Horwitz, Amy Davidson and Ken Grace talked about creative alternatives for bargaining in these tough economic times.  Joining them was Carol Chandor from Boston Benefits Partners.  Carol is an expert in public sector health care and gave an incredibly informative talk about how to judge various health plan alternatives, including the GIC.

After a break, Sandulli Grace Attorneys Joe Sandulli and John Becker discussed how to deal with the reality of layoffs, a topic that’s unfortunately too current.  SG’s Alan Shapiro and Bryan Decker then gave a blow-by-blow of the historic injunction MCOP and the BPPA were granted against the “banding” of police promotional scores.

The educational portion of the event ended with Sandulli Grace attorneys Leigh Panettiere and Patrick Bryant, joined by Police Lawyer Extraordinaire Thomas Drechesler and noted Psychologist Leo Polizoti, discussing the pitfalls of off duty misconduct.  Dr. Polizoti’s frank, behind-the-scene look at what goes into a psychological fitness for duty exam was the highlight of the day.

The day was capped off with a late lunch, during which Ken Grace recognized the winners of this year’s Sandulli Grace/MCOP Scholarship Essay Contest.  The annual event, open to the children of all MCOP members, awards 4 scholarships based on essays in response to a police related topic.  This year’s topic was the value of having sworn police officers providing traffic coordination at construction sites.  All of the essays were excellent.

Stay tuned next Spring for the announcement of the 2010 MCOP / Sandulli Grace police educational seminar.

 

State Agency Rules Police Union Violated Duty Of Fair Representation To Police Officer Fired For Beating His Wife – Sandulli Grace Offers Tips For Unions To Defeat DFR Claims

The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board has ruled that the Amherst Police League – which is NOT a client of Sandulli Grace, PC and is NOT represented by any Sandulli Grace client – violated its duty of fair representation in its handling of a grievance concerning the termination of police sergeant.  The case, Amherst Police League, MUP-05-4521(April 23, 2009), underscores the need for Unions to adhere to internal procedures for grievances, even for grievances that seem downright worthless.  As a result of the DFR violations, the police union here could suffer significant financial damages.  Amherst Police League serves as an unfortunate playbook in how NOT to process a grievance. 

In this case, an alcohol-fueled Amherst Police Sergeant beat his wife at home during an off-duty argument.  His repeated hits resulted in injury to his wife.  The Sergeant fled the scene to his mother’s Vermont residence.  He turned himself into police the next day.  He subsequently admitted himself to hospital for depression, anxiety, and later treated by a psychologist for those issues and alcohol abuse.  He was charged criminally with domestic assault and battery, a misdemeanor.  He ultimately admitted to sufficient facts on this criminal charge, which was continued without a finding and later dismissed after a year of probation. 

 During the Town’s investigation, the Sergeant and a Union attorney met with the Town.  At the meeting, the Union attorney advised the Sergeant to say nothing because any statement could be used in a criminal proceeding against him.  Subsequently, the Town fired the Sergeant. 

 As a non-civil service town, the Sergeant’s primary way to challenge the termination was through the grievance procedure.  The grievance process here involved four levels: Step 1 (immediate supervisor) Step 2 (Chief), Step 3 (Town Manager) and Step 4 (arbitration).  The contract permits only the Union Grievance Committee to pursue a grievance beyond Step 1. 

 After being fired, the Sergeant then filed a grievance with his immediate supervisor and with the Town Manager.  His letter to the Town Manager said his private attorney would contact the Town Manager.  The private attorney never did.  After Step 1, the Union Grievance Committee then tabled the grievance for several months, without getting the Town’s written agreement to hold off.  The Union failed to communicate with the Sergeant or his attorney about the termination grievance for several months.

 During this grievance process, the Union’s attorney (a novice in labor law) promised the Sergeant’s private attorney that the Union will demand arbitration and will let the Sergeant’s attorney litigate the case (so long as the Sergeant pays the legal fees).  The Town expressed a general willingness to meet with the Sergeant about settlement, but the Union never relayed this offer to the Sergeant.  The Union also never invited the Sergeant to grievance meetings.

The Union Grievance Committee met with the Chief and the Town’s HR Director without the Sergeant.  Both the Chief and the HR director denied the grievance in writing.  The HR director’s response relied in part on the Sergeant’s refusal to speak on his own behalf.  The Union did not seek any legal advice on the merits of the grievance, although the Union’s lawyer (who primarily did real estate work) advised them to go to arbitration.  The Union then voted not to appeal this decision to arbitration and in part, relying on the Sergeant’s silence.  It failed to notify the grievant about its decision for two months.

 The Sergeant then filed a charge of prohibited practice with the Division of Labor Relations/CERB, alleging that the Union violated its duty of fair representation under the Law. CERB agreed with the Sergeant.  It ruled that the Union violated its duty of fair representation to the Sergeant through the following acts:

 

  • The Union failed to notify the Sergeant during the grievance process about the Town’s willingness to meet with the Sergeant to discuss his employment situation, even though there is no evidence that the Town would have altered its stance during such a meeting.  CERB wrote, “The Union’s failure to alert [him] to this pivotal opportunity to challenge his termination shows a reckless disregard for [his] grievance and his contractual rights”
  •  The Union unfairly combined Steps 2 and 3 of the grievance process.  CERB wrote, “The Union made this assumption without taking steps to ascertain whether [the Town Manager] had authorized [the HR Director] to act as his Step 3 representative at the meeting, or whether the Town had intended and agreed to merge the grievance steps.” 
  •  As a result, CERB concluded that the Union failed to timely file an appeal of the grievance to the Town Manager, which allegedly resulted in the termination being upheld.
  •  The Union promised to proceed to arbitration and then failed to do so.

 

There are several questionable facets to CERB’s decision.  Although CERB noted that the contract grants the Union with the exclusive right to process grievances, CERB seemingly disregarded G. L. c. 150, §5, a state law that entitles employees to individually process grievances without relying on labor organizations.  As a result of this state law, CERB placed inordinate emphasis on the Union’s handling of the grievance and less on the employee’s failure to assert his own rights. 

CERB also unnecessarily faulted the Union for believing that Steps 2 & 3 were combined.  The Union had a plausible argument that the Town, via its actions, agreed to merge these steps.  Finally, CERB appeared to impose a duty on Unions to relay detailed messages between employees and employers – such as the detailed reasons in support of a grievance and the employer’s offer to discuss the termination.  This duty appears to be higher than we believe previously existed for Unions.

CERB thankfully included a note in its opinion warning employees and unions that this case is highly unusual given the volume of errors made by the Union.  In other words, a Union that committed only one of the above errors might not be found to have violated its duty of fair representation.  CERB noted,“[W]e nevertheless affirm the general principle that a union that initially files a grievance for arbitration retains the discretion to subsequently withdraw it, so long as it makes a reasoned, non-negligent judgment, untainted by improper motives, about the merits of the grievance.”

As a result of the decision, the Union was ordered to see if the Town is willing to arbitrate the termination. If the Town is willing, then the Union has to pay for an independent attorney to represent the Sergeant.  If the Town is unwilling – and it is unlikely to imagine the Town will volunteer to expose itself to liability for terminating the Sergeant– the Union will be forced to pay lost wages to the Sergeant.  The only way the Union can avoid liability is for it to show that an arbitrator likely would have upheld the termination In other words, the Union has an incentive to show that the Town deservedly terminated one of its members.

Even though the case involved a highly unusual amount of errors, the case reminds Unions of the benefits of using best practices for resolving grievances.  The following practices are not necessarily strictly mandated by a duty of fair representation they may help defeat claims.

 

  • Review your by-laws and constitution to determine your procedure for handling grievances and then follow this procedure.
  • Notify the grievant of his or her ability to file his or her own grievance.
  • Unless fully persuaded after an investigation that a grievance is meritless, file a grievance and process it through all steps up to arbitration.
  • Vigilantly observe and enforce grievance deadlines (or seek extensions from the employer).
  • Consider inviting the grievant to participate at steps of the grievance process and let the grievant present any non-frivolous argument on his or her own behalf (that does not mean the Union has to agree with the grievant)
  • Notify the grievant in writing about relevant steps or developments of the process.
  • Provide the grievant with an opportunity to present an argument in support of the grievance prior to(or during) Union deliberations about whether to demand arbitration.
  • Demand arbitration even if (or especially if) the Union has not completed its decision-making process for proceed to arbitration and permitted the grievant to appeal the Union’s decision.  The Union can always withdraw its demand later!
  • If the Union demands arbitration, notify the grievant in writing that the Union has the right to withdraw arbitration.
  • If the Union declines to demand arbitration, notify the grievant in writing about any appeal process and the reasons for the Union’s decision to forgo arbitration.

Again, a Union’s failure to adopt any or all of the above policies does not necessarily violate its duty of fair representation.  

HRD Appears To Have Given Up On Banding

Based on the attached memo sent to the police chiefs by HRD, it appears the agency has finally relented and will establish promotional lists from the October 2008 exam in the traditional “whole number” formula.

As the memo goes on to state, HRD will attempt through rulemaking to change the current rule requiring scores in whole numbers.  If the rule is changed, they would then, presumably, band results of the next promotional examinations.

 I know that within seconds of this entry’s going out, we will be asked these questions:  (1) “Will you challenge banding in rulemaking?” and (2) “What is the likelihood of winning such a challenge?”  The answer to Question 1 is simple: we will do what our clients ask us to do.  To stop banding of this exam, our clients Mass. Coalition of Police and Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association jointly retained us.  Whether to contest the issue in rulemaking will be their decision.  As for the likelihood of a successful legal challenge to the rulemaking, I will say only that there are arguments that could be raised on both sides of the issue.

We (my law partner Bryan Decker and myself) again want to thank all of you for your support, but most especially our clients, MCOP and BPPA, without whom HRD would have been able to run roughshod over its own rules and the merit-based system Civil Service is supposed to be.

Download Memo

HRD Now Reporting Scores In Whole Numbers

Some good news today on the Banding case front, as officers who log onto the HRD website to see their exam scores are now being given whole number scores.  As far as we know, lists are not yet established.  We spoke with the Assistant Attorney General representing HRD in our lawsuit today, and she indicated that we should know within a week. 

Several people have called or written to inquire whether our suit prohibits HRD’s delay in producing lists.  They point to G.L. c. 31, §25, which requires that lists be compiled within six months of the administration of the exam (a statute that HRD itself raised to the Court in urging speedy action on the case).  The bottom line is “no.”  Our case only protested the banding of test scores.  Any challenge to the timing of the certification of lists would need to occur via a separate action.  Given that it is likely that lists will be released before any action could be heard, we are unaware of any present plans to file such an action.  However, keep tuned, as we realize that the patience of those waiting for lists cannot last forever.

As always, we’ll let you know as soon as we know.  To get notification of blog updates, enter your e-mail in the box under “Join our Mailing List” in the upper left corner of this (or any blog) page.

And a very happy May Day to all.  

Superior Court Grants BPPA and MCOP Request for Injunction – Orders HRD to NOT Band Scores on Police Promotional Eligibility Lists

In a thoughtful, well-reasoned 11-page decision issued this morning, Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Bruce Henry ordered the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division to NOT “band” scores on police promotional eligibility lists. Here’s the full decision. Judge Henry agreed with the arguments advanced by Sandulli Grace Attorneys Alan Shapiro and Bryan Decker that HRD must follow the statutory rule-making process before “banding” scores rather than issue them by “whole numbers.”  The decision does not inhibit HRD’s ability to issue promotional lists as Judge Henry expressly notes HRD can keep issuing lists under the traditional “whole number” format.  This decision represents a significant victory for the merit-based principles that serve as the foundation of the Civil Service system and a victory for the faith that the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, Inc. and Massachusetts Coalition of Police placed in this system.

As you may recall, HRD for decades listed promotional candidates in the order of the exam scores of police officers.  HRDs rules require the agency to rank scores in order of “whole numbers.” In other words, HRD ranked both 88.4 and 88.1 as an 88.  In February, HRD reversed this longstanding practice by announcing it would group scores among ranges, or “bands” of up to seven points as equivalent.  Sandulli Grace, PC, on behalf of BPPA, MCOP, and several individual police officers, filed suit.

Injunctions are rarely granted in Massachusetts.  Courts only can grant them if the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the practice, the plaintiffs seeking the injunction have a likelihood of success, and if an injunction will serve the public interest.  On all points, the Judge sided with our clients.  After summarizing the facts of the case, Judge Henry concluded that plaintiffs have “standing” to challenge HRD’s actions and thereby rejected one of the Civil Service Commission’s major arguments.  In his finding on standing, the Judge favorably cited the plaintiffs’ contention that banding will allow increased favoritism into promotional decisions:

The plaintiffs also contend that the banded scores will expand the candidate pool, thus increasing the potential that promotions will be based on favoritism and bias, rather than merit…  In addition, by creating a promotional system that provides fewer safeguards against favoritism and bias, the Division has potentially violated its duty to the plaintiffs.  Accordingly, I am persuaded that the plaintiffs have standing to maintain an action under G. L. c. 231A to challenge the banded promotional eligibility lists.

 Turning to “likelihood of success,” The Judge again sided with the BPPA and MCOP in concluding that plaintiffs have a “strong likelihood of success” on our claim that HRD violated its statutory obligation to conduct rulemaking prior to banding scores:

The practice of banding scores represents a significant departure from the way scores have been reported in the past.  While the proposed banding will be reported as whole number bands, the scoring is very different than what appears to have been intended by the requirement that scores be reported in whole numbers.  The scoring bands are a significant change in the manner of scoring and establishing the eligibility lists and that change should have been put in place using the procedure established by the Legislature for making a significant change in the rules. G.L. c. 31, §4. (emphasis added).

Turning to the issue of “harm,” the Judge found that an injunction will promote the public interest by upholding the integrity of the Civil Service system:

[A] determination of the issues raised by the plaintiffs will promote the public’s interest in guarding against political considerations, favoritism, and bias in governmental hiring and promotion … and ensuring that the system operates on ‘basic merit principles, as defined in G.L. c. 31, § 1, absent properly documented and supported bases for departing from such principles in particular cases. (citation omitted, emphasis added).

 

With regards to the harm claimed by HRD – that an injunction will delay promotions – the Judge agreed with what we’ve been saying all along – that any delay is caused by HRD.  HRD can let municipalities make promotions TODAY by issuing lists with whole number scores:

While the defendants assert that any delay in the implementation of the new scoring method will impact communities which are attempting to fill vacancies on their police forces, I do not so find.  There is nothing which prevents the HRD from issuing eligibility lists in the same fashion that it has done so for years.

 

Finally, the Judge issued his conclusion and order:

Conclusion

            For these reasons, I find that a preliminary injunction should enter enjoining the defendants from issuing eligibility lists for the promotion of police officers in score bands rather than in the manner in which it has been doing so until a final resolution of this matter on its merits.

 

ORDER

            Until a final resolution of this matter on its merits, the defendants are preliminarily enjoined from issuing eligibility lists for promotions of police officers in score bands rather than in the manner in which such score have been reported up to the time of this proposed change.

 

 

SO WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

            Obviously, this decision affirms of the deeply-held faith that the BPPA and MCOP have long placed in the merit-based principles that form the cornerstone of the Civil Service system.  This faith was tested and ridiculed by the arrogance of HRD and the Civil Service Commission’s refusal to hear the case. 

            It is not 100% clear where this case will go from here.  As HRD has repeatedly stated, it is under a statutory obligation to issue lists within 6 months of the taking of the exam, i.e. by April 20.  We hope that HRD will abide by Judge Henry’s thorough decision and the law and issue those lists in a timely fashion with scores listed and ranked in WHOLE NUMBERS. 

As always, we will keep you posted…