Category Archives: In Our Opinion…

Quinn Bill Eligibility of Rehired or Transferred Police Officers

Once a police officer qualifies for Quinn Bill benefits, the benefits cannot be terminated if the officer is rehired or transferred after the Quinn Bill cut-off date of July 1, 2009.

Under the recent Quinn Bill amendments police officers hired after July 1, 2009 are no longer eligible to participate in the Quinn Bill benefits.  Municipal employers have contended that officers eligible for the Quinn Bill who are rehired or transferred after that date lose their Quinn Bill eligibility.  This issue has arisen in the following ways for officers hired before July 1, 2009 who qualified for Quinn Bill: 1) The officer resigns from the police service, but is then rehired by the same municipality after July 1, 2009; 2) The officer transfers to another department after July 1, 2009; 3) The officer is laid off and is recalled into another department after July 1, 2009.

The Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, which administers the Quinn Bill, has now definitively answered that all of these rehired and transferred police officers remain eligible for Quinn Bill Benefits.   In a recent communication with our office the Department has stated that it is their policy “that an approved PCIPP (Police Career Incentive Payment Policy) eligibility status is never revoked.  Thus, if an approved PCIPP officer leaves employment and returns at a later date, or transfers from one department to another, the officer retains his or her PCIPP eligibility.”    

NLRB Withdraws Lawsuit Against Boeing

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”; “the Board”) dropped its retaliation lawsuit against Boeing at the urging of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“Machinists”) after it signed a contract with Boeing on Dec. 9, 2011.  The NLRB brought the case in April 2011, after Boeing moved a production line from Washington state to a non-union shop in South Carolina in retaliation against workers for staging a strike in 2008.

The NLRB decision to file a complaint drew controversy from the outset.  The NLRB found that Boeing’s motives were retaliatory after Boeing executives admitted that the Machinists’s history of striking (workers in Washington state have staged five strikes since 1977) was an “overriding factor” in deciding to open the South Carolina plant. The National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) forbids employers from retaliating against and intimidating unions from protected activities such as engaging in strikes.  However, the Act also allows employers to make decisions on hiring and building new facilities so long as the decision is not unlawful.  Since the NLRB issued the complaint, the House, in response, passed the Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act, which would strip the Board of its authority to order a shutdown of corporate operations, even if an employer violates labor law.  The bill is now awaiting a Senate vote.  Additionally, Congressional Republicans have threatened to block President Obama’s nominations to the Board.  The five-member board currently has two openings, and another seat will open later this month.

In the end, NLRB v. Boeing is a victory for unions and serves as a testament to the effectiveness of collective bargaining.  Workers successfully sought to enforce their rights through available legal means.  The NLRB complaint armed the Machinists with a huge bargaining chip at the negotiation table, and as a result, the parties were able to mutually agree to a contract and settle the case.  The parties achieved all this without the need for a strike, litigation, or third-party intervention, which is the ultimate goal of collective bargaining.

What is the Heart Bill?

The Heart Law presumption, commonly called the “Heart Bill” presumes that a police officer’s heart ailment is work-related for purposes of accidental disability retirement, unless there is sufficient evidence to rebut it.  In other words, if you have a heart ailment (e.g., you have a heart attack), you are entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits unless the entity opposing the presumption can provide “competent evidence” proving that it was not work related.  Even if there is absolutely no evidence that the impairment is work-related, the presumption stands.  Attempts to overcome the presumption by pointing out numerous risk factors such as high cholesterol, obesity, or smoking arte typically unsuccessful because the mere existence of risk factors does not in and of itself rebut the presumption.  The impact of the risk factors must include substantial evidence of how the risk factors affected the individual.

Even in the event that a heart ailment could not be said to have arisen in the line of duty, Massachusetts law provides that if a pre-existing condition is accelerated as a result of a hazard on the job, causation for the injury is established, even if the pre-existing condition is not work-related.  For example, court cases have ruled that a police officer’s hypertension was exacerbated by normal police duties and thus work-related and that a fire fighter’s degenerative disc disease was exacerbated by working on a fire truck and thus work-related.

Furthermore, if you have a collective bargaining agreement that applies the Heart Law presumption to “injured-on-duty” leave, you may be entitled to 111F leave if you have a heart ailment and decide to go back to work.  For example, if you have a heart attack and take 4 weeks to recover, you may be entitled to receive 111F pay for that time period instead of being forced to use your sick days.  You should contact your union representative if you believe this may affect you.

Civil Service Knocks Out Quincy Mayor’s Choice for Fire Chief and a Judge Agrees

Based on many recent Civil Service decisions and, even more poignantly, the courts’ reaction to those decisions, many of us concluded that challenging a bypass promotional case was about as promising as hitting a trifecta at your local race track. [1] That perception, however, may no longer be accurate.  A 60 page decision by Commissioner Paul Stein in September in the case of Smyth v. City of Quincy, not only upheld a bypass appeal for the position of Quincy Fire Chief, but also removed the appointee from the permanent position and, in very specific terms, ordered the city how to go about properly selecting the next chief from the three highest scores on the certification.  When the city appealed to Superior Court to enjoin the Commission’s decision from taking effect, the judge, in a decision issued on November 21, refused to intervene on the grounds that the city was likely to lose its appeal.

By way of background, civil service law, all contained in Mass. General Laws Chapter 31, compels that promotions be made from among the three highest scoring applicants on a certification (a list of candidates with passing scores ranked numerically by the state Human Resources Division [HRD]).  If the appointing authority, in the case of Quincy Fire, the mayor, selects a candidate other than one with the highest score, s/he must supply the reasons for doing so.  The higher scoring candidates may then lodge bypass appeals with the Civil Service Commission.

The Civil Service decision concluded that Quincy’s mayor was predisposed to appointing a politically well-placed candidate and that his proffered rationale was a smokescreen to obfuscate his predisposition.  The case contains an excellent primer, with abundant citations, on what an appellant needs to show in order to prevail in a bypass appeal.

The remedy is particularly noteworthy.  Ordering that the permanent appointment be rescinded is rare but not unique.  Prescribing how the city must make the next appointment in order to remove any bias and instill the process with integrity is virtually unprecedented.  Commissioner Stein has set out a blueprint for what appointing authorities must do to insulate themselves from bypass challenges, and a road map for future appellants to follow in asserting such challenges.  The specific requirements (quoted directly from the decision) are:

(a) candidate interviews must be conducted by a panel to be selected and arranged by an independent outside individual or firm that has experience in the review and selection of public safety and/or senior public sector personnel in Massachusetts;

(b) neither the outside individual or firm, nor any member of the interview panel shall have any present or prior contractual, employment or familial relationship to the Mayor of Quincy or to any of the candidates;

(c) the candidates will be provided, also reasonably in advance of the interview, a description of the criteria by which their credentials and their interview performance will be evaluated;

(d) the evaluation criteria shall be established by the independent individual or firm selected to arrange the interviews, and shall contain such procedures and criteria that the outside individual or firm deems appropriate in consideration of a candidate for Fire Chief, provided that Quincy may contribute its input to the independent individual or firm as to any aspect of the interview process, including evaluation criteria, as it deems appropriate, and further provided that any communications between Quincy and the independent individual or firm shall be disclosed to each of the candidates;

(e) the interview panel shall render a written report of the interviews which shall be made available to each of the candidates and to the public; and

(f) the written report shall include a specific rating of each candidate?s performance in each component or question during the interview, an overall ranking of the candidates, and a description of any unique positive and/or negative qualities or experience noted about any of the candidates.

Attorney Betsy Ehrenberg is to be highly commended for her excellent work in not only attaining this favorable precedent but also in successfully defending it, at least through this initial phase, in the courts.

It is also hoped that the specificity of the remedy will send a message to the public safety community: the days of perverting what is supposed to be a merit-based promotional system based on who someone is rather than what the person knows and has done are over.

 

[1] In the interest of full disclosure, I did hit one on my first visit to Saratoga, however, subsequent visits have confirmed it was beginner’s, or dumb, luck.

“Evergreen” Problem Fixed by Legislature

Last fall, the state Supreme Judicial Court overturned 30 years of history and held that “evergreen clauses” – clauses that extend collective bargaining agreements until a new contract is negotiated – were unlawful and unenforceable if the clause operated to extend a collective bargaining agreement beyond three years. This wreeked havoc in some communities because employers took advantage of the ruling by refusing to arbitrate grievances after a three- year contract expired. In addition, some employers took the position that they were not bound by any of the terms of the contract after three years, despite the fact that the employer had agreed to an evergreen provision.

This problem was corrected by the legislature on November 17thin House 3789-11. As a result of diligent efforts, persistence and lobbying by a broad coalition of public sector unions over the past year, the legislature enacted a bill that reverses the SJC ruling — reaffirming that evergreen clauses are enforceable even if they operate to extend the contract beyond three years. In addition, and again due to the extraordinary efforts of the labor coalition, the legislation contains a retroactivity provision. Section 2 of the new law restores evergreen clauses to any collective bargaining agreement that contained an evergreen provision and had expired after three years under the SJC decision. Evergreen clauses in such agreements are resurrected and enforceable going forward – even as to matters that arose prior to this legislation. So, if you are under a three year contract with an evergreen clause that had expired under the SJC ruling, the contract has been restored and is enforceable until a new contract is negotiated.

There is a narrow exception the retroactivity provision. The law does not apply are “specific matters” that “were pending or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction” at the time that law was passed. There will undoubtedly be litigation about which cases fall under that exception. But the vast majority of matters are back under the umbrella of evergreen clauses. This bill is now awaiting the Governor’s signature.

Read The Bill…

I’m shocked, SHOCKED, to learn that the Globe doesn’t like the Quinn Bill

OK, just when you thought it was okay to put aside the Quinn bill case until the SJC issues a ruling, our “friends” over on Morrissey Boulevard decide they need to chime in on the case – by writing an editorial urging the SJC to rule against the right of officers to be paid according to the law.  Yes, the Globe’s editorial board (not sure how many lawyers on that one) ran an editorial telling the state’s Supreme Judicial Court how to rule on a case.  Here’s the editorial. http://bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2011/11/17/dispute-over-police-benefit-don-leave-cities-holding-bag/b5lHRrNsAoIvC2sg6IFYNO/story.html

Totally apart from the merits of the Quinn Bill (many cities and towns, in addition to the vast majority of educated police officers, probably would disagree with calling the program a “boondoggle.”), the Globe is suggesting that the Court ignore the law because cities and towns are facing tough times.  That’s a bit scary.  Anyway, here’s what I wrote in a letter to the editor (wasn’t printed today, maybe they’ll print it tomorrow):

To the editor,

 

The Globe advocates that the Supreme Judicial Court disregard the law due to a fiscal crisis when it urges the Court to rule against Boston Police Officers seeking to enforce their statutory right to receive Quinn bill payments.  Unfortunately for the Globe, the SJC is the ultimate arbiter of Massachusetts law; it is not the ultimate fiscal watchdog for the legislature and municipalities.

 

The Globe correctly points out that the officers’ unions agreed that the city would reduce benefits if the state did not reimburse the City for Quinn bill payments.  However, because the law specifies the benefits levels, the parties were not free to enter into agreements that violate it.  This is not a “narrow argument,” as the Globe suggests, it is the law.  As John Adams so concisely stated, we are a nation of laws, not men.

 

The Globe has long editorialized against the virtue of the Quinn Bill.  However, this case is not about the merits of that law, it is about whether the City of Boston can disregard the law during tough economic times.  The Globe suggests the SJC turn down a dangerous path in advocating that the City be allowed to do just that.

 

Sincerely,

Bryan Decker

Sandulli Grace, PC

(the author is counsel to the plaintiff officers in Adams v. Boston, the case at issue here, and argued the case before the Supreme Judicial Court)

 

In any event, the SJC has taken the matter under advisement.  I don’t for a minute think that the Court will decide the case based on a directive from the Globe, but it’s disconcerting that the Globe editors would let their longstanding disdain for the Quinn program cause them to recommend that the law be ignored.  If they want to take their case to the state house, they should.  And we’ll be there, hopefully with Bob Quinn leading the charge, to continue to explain why and educated police force is in EVERYONE’s best interest.  And you, as police officers, can also explain to the Globe how the law needs to be followed, even when they disagree with it.

Oh, and since the Globe’s editorial was less than unbiased, I feel fully justified in passing along this link about the paper’s circulation:  http://www.theonion.com/video/boston-globe-tailors-print-edition-for-three-remai,17572/

Greater Lowell Regional Teachers Organization And Greater Lowell Technical School Committee

Arbitrator rules that a teacher without professional teacher status is entitled to procedural protections under the collective bargaining agreement before a School Committee can non-renew the teacher’s appointment.

In this case, the teacher was notified of the intention to non-renew her appointment on May 26, 2009 and then dismissed on June 7, 2009. The arbitrator found that the teacher was denied reappointment as a consequence of the evaluation process and that the procedures followed in that evaluation process violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement required that the information that formed the basis for the recommendation to non-renew a teacher must be properly documented before the notice of intent to non-renew. The arbitrator also specifically relied on DESE regulations which provide that a teacher must be given “a reasonable amount of time… to implement the recommendations for improvement of performance and to meet performance standards.” In this case the arbitrator found that the teacher’s supervisor failed to give the teacher anything in writing to establish any deadlines. The arbitrator noted that “Experience demonstrates that parties to a conversation often draw different impressions about the substance and tenor of the discussion. And, consequently, it is generally a good practice to follow-up important conversations with confirmatory letters or memoranda.”

Therefore, the School Department’s failure to document the teacher’s claimed deficiencies and give the teacher proper written notice of those alleged deficiencies along with an opportunity to correct the issues violated the collective bargaining agreement.

The teacher was therefore ordered to be reinstated with full back pay and benefits.

Reconsidering a Ticket: An Exercise of Discretion or a Criminal Act?

A New York grand jury has charged ten New York City police officers with crimes for “fixing” traffic tickets. The charges resulted from a wiretap for unrelated matters during which investigators overheard discussions of fixing tickets. The crimes charged were the alteration or destruction of the public records and official misconduct.

Massachusetts has similar laws which might be applied to ticket fixing. M.G.L. c. 66, s. 15 establishes criminal penalties for destroying public records. Likewise M.G.L. c. 268A, s. 26 (the employee ethics law) imposes criminal penalties for use of your position to gain benefit for yourself or others and for acting or failing to act based on kinship or influence. M.G.L. c. 268A, s. 23 (b) (2) & (3). The Boston Globe is already investigating ticket fixing in Massachusetts and their reporters have called local police officers to ask for comment.

A police officer in Massachusetts still has discretion whether or not to issue a traffic ticket. Newton Police Association v. Police Chief of Newton, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 697 (2005):

If a police officer observes…a civil motor vehicle infraction, the officer may issue a written warning or may cite the violator for a civil motor vehicle infraction…

M.G.L.c. 90C, s. 3(A)(1). Once the officer issues a ticket, however, there is no guidance about what circumstances justify revoking it. While we would argue that the officer retains broad discretion to reconsider and revoke the ticket, we would urge special caution in this environment. If you reconsider and decide to revoke a ticket, you should consider documenting an appropriate reason for your action and/or getting documented approval from a superior officer. If you are a supervisor or court officer, you should likewise document an appropriate reason for any decision not to prosecute a violation.

SJC To Hear Quinn Oral Argument On November 8

We just got word that the Supreme Judicial Court has scheduled oral argument for Adams v. Boston for November 8, 2011 at 9:00a.m. At issue in the case is whether a municipality can cut Quinn Bill payments to officers based on the underfunding of reimbursements by the state. Sandulli Grace Attorney Bryan Decker will be arguing the case for the Boston Officers challenging cuts to their educational benefit.

Suffolk University provides a live videocast of SJC oral arguments at http://www.suffolk.edu/sjc/ . If you miss the live broadcast, Suffolk will post an archive copy of the video within a few days of the argument. The case number is SJC-10861 if you’d like to watch. While the SJC courtroom is open to the public, there is very little seating available, and we do not encourage folks to attend the oral argument in person.

Civil Service Suspensions: 5 Days Can Be 8 But Not 16

While, for the Beatles, eight days a week may not have been enough to show they cared, the Appeals Court has said that it is enough for a five-day suspension.

Civil Service law, Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 31, § 41, allows a police or fire chief to suspend a tenured civil servant “for just cause for a period of five days or less without a hearing prior to such suspension.” [emphasis added]. The statute goes on: “Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall not be counted in the computation of any period of time specified in this section.” The employee is forced to serve the suspension but may (within 48 hours) appeal to the appointing authority for a hearing on whether the chief did indeed have just cause for the punishment. To suspend employees for more than five days or to demote or terminate them, the appointing authority must first hold a hearing before issuing those greater disciplines.

When the Andover fire chief issued a four-day suspension to a Lt. Thornton, he ordered that the four days be served on the lieutenant’s next four scheduled 24-hour shifts, spanning a 16 day period. Not surprisingly, the Civil Service Commission, by a 3-2 vote in an opinion written by Chairman Bowman, had no problem with allowing the chief to take away two weeks’ pay and prevent the lieutenant from working overtime or details for 16 days, all as part of a four-day suspension without a hearing.

This punitive interpretation was first overturned by the Superior Court and then, last week, by the Appeals Court. In Thornton v. Civil Service Commission, Justice Rubin, writing for a 2-1 majority of the three-judge panel, made this Solomonic observation: “Whatever a suspension of ‘a period of five days or less’ is, it is not a suspension under which an employee may not work for sixteen days.”

The Appeals Court decided that the five-day suspension period means five consecutive calendar days, excluding weekends and holidays. A five-day suspension could run from Monday through Friday, Tuesday through the next Monday (remember weekends don’t count), etc. The decision has the practical effect of letting the chief, for the most part, take away a week’s pay and prevent the employee from working overtime/details for the same week. This does raise the question: If weekends and holidays don’t count as part of the suspension period, why should employees also be suspended on those days and prohibited from performing extra work on them?

While the decision is not perfect, it is a reasonable attempt at applying a statute obviously geared to people who work Monday through Friday, nine to five, to the “four and two” and “24 hour” shifts, which did not become prevalent until long after 1978, when the statutory language was written.

One problematic aspect of the Appeals Court decision is language permitting the chief to begin the suspension on a particular day of his/her choosing.  An overreaching chief could, therefore, begin an alleged miscreant’s five-day suspension on Tuesday, October 4. Because of the weekend/holiday exclusion and the October 10 Columbus Day holiday, it could run through Tuesday, October 11.  If the employee were returning to his/her “four-and-two” on the 4th, it could actually cost six days’ pay and, depending on the contract, the holiday pay also.

Suffice it to say that the Appeals Court has reduced a “five-day suspension” from sixteen to, at most, eight days. It’s at least a step in the right direction