Category Archives: Sandulli Grace In The News

Attleboro Police Association, MassCOP Local 352 – Accidental Disability Retirement of Detective James Cote

On November 2, 2010, Attleboro Police Detective James Cote, who was also President of the Attleboro Police Association, MassCOP Local 352, suffered a cardiac arrest in his home and was in critical condition for days.  MassCOP members throughout the state showed their support for Det. Cote and his family.  Det. Cote made an astounding recovery in the face of a prognosis of a mere 5% chance of survival.  However, he suffered memory loss from lack of oxygen.  While able to resume many of the activities of his daily life, Det. Cote was unable to continue his work as a police officer, and had to retire at the age of forty.

Det. Cote’s Union, represented by Leigh Panettiere of Sandulli Grace, P.C., assisted Det. Cote in filing an application for accidental disability retirement with the City of Attleboro Retirement Board, taking the position that Det. Cote’s cardiac arrest was work-related.  Det. Cote’s cardiologist diagnosed Det. Cote with a hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, usually an inherited condition.  Hypertrophic cardiomyopathy often causes sudden death in professional athletes, who appear completely healthy one moment but die of a sudden cardiac arrest the next.  One member of the medical panel believed that the existence of this so called “risk factor” exempted Det. Cote from the heart law presumption.

However, the Union was able to demonstrate through Police Department records and the testimony of Det. Cote’s fellow detectives that Det. Cote’s underlying heart condition had been exacerbated by the stress of a high-profile, high-pressure murder investigation that Det. Cote was spearheading up until the night before his cardiac arrest, and that, therefore, even if the heart law presumption did not apply, Det. Cote was entitled to an accidental disability retirement because his job had accelerated the condition.

Thanks to a well-written, thorough affidavit by Det. Cote’s cardiologist, a dedicated local Retirement Board willing to do the extra work necessary to understand the medical evidence, and the support of his Union and the Police Department, the Accidental Disability Retirement application was accepted by the Retirement Board, and it was approved by PERAC on June 27, 2013.

MassCOP and Attorney Panettiere were happy to be able to assist Det. Cote in the face of this daunting injury, and continue to send their good wishes to him and his family.

 

Never Let The Truth Get In The Way Of A Good Story: David Williams And BPD Commissioner Ed Davis

On June 20, highly respected Arbitrator Michael Ryan issued a decision overturning the discharge of Boston Police Officer David Williams. All of the facts are meticulously set out in the decision’s 44 pages but are briefly summarized here.

On March 16, 2009, Michael O’Brien was a Middlesex Deputy Sheriff/Corrections Officer coming off his Providence bachelor party and St. Patrick’s Day celebrations.  After spending up to five hours at the Black Rose, a noted Fanueil Hall bar, he and two buddies headed to the North End, where one of them lived.  While trying to back his car down Hanover Street (the major two-way thoroughfare through the densely populated commercial area), his friend crossed the double-yellow line into a double-parked BMW.  The BMW owner called 911 as he saw O’Brien drive off in the car that had just struck his.  His recorded 911 comments included observations that O’Brien’s group were “drunk” and that although he was a “federal agent,” they were not in any trouble.

When Officers David Williams and Diep Nguyen responded to the call, their efforts to simply have the parties exchange papers were met by the seeming drunken hostility of O’Brien and his friends.  O’Brien held out his cell phone while yelling at the officers to do their jobs.  Inexplicably, he insisted the officers investigate the struck driver’s claims of federal agency.  Told that he could record them all he wanted but not in the middle of Hanover Street, O’Brien continued standing in the busy street.  When Officer Nguyen attempted to place him under arrest, O’Brien’s resistance caused Officer Williams, across the street writing a citation in his parked cruiser, to come to his fellow officer’s assistance.  Surrounded by O’Brien’s two friends, one of whom had to be physically pushed away from the officers, Williams made an “officer in trouble” call just as Nguyen was about to do the same.  Other officers arrived and O’Brien was placed under arrest.

The next business day, O’Brien, charged with disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and assault and battery on a police officer (Nguyen), appeared in the Boston Municipal Court without notice to any of the arresting officers.  He plead not guilty and all charges were dismissed a month later after he performed 50 hours of community service.

O’Brien eventually filed a lawsuit against the officers and the city, claiming, among other allegations, that he had been nearly choked to death that night by Officer Williams.  That night, he had made no complaint of having been choked to the lieutenant who carefully inspected him at booking nor to the EMT’s who transferred him to the hospital.  Early on, he retained prominent civil rights attorney Howard Friedman.  As it turned out, for him, that was his best decision of all.

Three days after the incident, O’Brien filed an on-line complaint against the officers who arrested and subdued him.  The BPD’s vaunted Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) conducted no investigation.  In September 2009, Atty. Friedman filed a complaint in Federal District Court against the City, Nguyen, Williams, and four other officers.  Friedman also initiated a second Internal Affairs complaint with the same allegations.  Still no investigation by the crack IAD unit.  In January, 2010, Friedman wrote a letter to Internal Affairs castigating them for failing to investigate the complaint.  In April 2010, IAD sprang into action, interviewing Williams and Nguyen for the first time about the incident that had occurred over a year earlier.  Shortly after receiving another irate letter from Atty. Friedman, BPD placed Williams on paid administrative leave.  IAD reassigned the case to another Lt. Det., who re-interviewed the officers, spent 20 minutes with BPD Dr. Kristian Arnold, and concluded that (a) Williams had choked O’Brien and (b) Williams had lied about it.

Following internal hearings before a Deputy Superintendent appointed by Commissioner Davis at which O’Brien, Williams, and Nguyen testified, Davis fired Williams in January 2012.  Shortly thereafter, the City paid O’Brien $1.4 million.  Williams had received unwanted notoriety after his discharge in the celebrated beating of Police Officer Michael Cox had been overturned by a different arbitrator in 2005.[1]

After hearing three days of testimony from all of the key witnesses, including O’Brien, Williams, and Nguyen, Arbitrator Ryan concluded:

After examining all of the evidence with great care, it is clear to me that O’Brien’s account of the incident was not truthful. If the officers became aggressive, and there is no doubt that they did, it was because the behavior of O’Brien and his friends warranted it. I do not believe that the grievant used excessive force, or that he choked or strangled O’Brien. He fully complied with Department Rule 304, Section 2, by using only the amount of force that was reasonably necessary to overcome O’Brien’s resistance to arrest.

He found further:

Since the grievant handled the incident of March 16, 2009, appropriately and did not use excessive force on O’Brien, it follows that he was not guilty of untruthfulness during the IAD investigation. There was no just cause for his termination.

The Arbitrator ordered Williams reinstated with back pay.  In addition, finding no explanation from the BPD for placing Williams on administrative leave 17 months after the incident, and relying on arbitration precedents between the parties, he ordered that Williams be made whole for the extra work (paid details and overtime) he was not allowed to earn while he had been on administrative leave.

The decision itself was not surprising.  Arbitrators, especially experienced and nationally prominent ones such as Michael Ryan, decide the cases based on the evidence before them, not on how they will be received by police commissioners or their friends in the media.  For that matter, Arbitrator Ryan, who has been hearing cases between the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association and the City/BPD for more than 15 years, has decided many cases against the BPPA, including terminations and major suspensions.  He does his job: he calls them as he sees them.

What followed this decision is unfortunate, if predictable.  To Commissioner Davis, who attended none of the hearings, either at the BPD or the arbitration, the decision was “outrageous.”  Boston Globe editorial writer and columnist Lawrence Harmon chimed in with his column entitled, “Do arbitrators give violent cops a pass?”  I spent more than a few hours on the phone with Mr. Harmon trying to educate him with facts and analysis about the vagaries, biases, and shortcomings of the BPD internal affairs process.  When he called me just before submitting his story for a final quote and I asked him why the information I had given him was largely omitted from his analysis, he replied that what I gave him was “inside baseball” that nobody cared about.  I was reminded of the adage, “Never let the truth get in the way of a good story.”

The real story, largely ignored by the press, is why did the City pay $1.4 million to someone a neutral factfinder, after hearing all the evidence, pronounced “untruthful.”  The Police Commissioner likes to trumpet his campaign of intolerance for untruthfulness among police officers.  No one disagrees; police officers charged with the power to deny people their liberty must be truthful.  But what about civilians who lie in order to line their pockets with enormous sums of money from the City?

Continuing its insistence on ignoring reality, the City/BPD has now filed an appeal of the arbitration decision in the Superior Court.  Its court complaint cloaks its disagreement with the arbitration decision in the dross of “contravening the City’s inherent and non-delegable authority, the Police Commissioner’s statutory right to manage and administer the Police Department…and a clearly established and defined public policy.”  Although unstated, the “clearly established and defined public policy” being violated is apparently that whatever Commissioner Davis says, goes.  The complaint flaunts black letter law.  Arbitration awards are appealable on very narrow grounds; disagreement with the arbitrator’s factual findings is decidedly not one of them.

This case could not have proceeded this far without the unflinching support of the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, and in particular its President Tom Nee and Vice President Ron MacGillivray.  In addition to my work in the case, Attorney Kenneth Anderson of Byrne & Drechsler, LLP, represented Officer Williams from the initial internal affairs interviews through the last day of arbitration and assisted in the Union’s arbitration brief with his usual combination of astute preparation, dogged litigation skills, and unfailingly gentlemanly demeanor.

I, at least, hold out hope that someone in authority will see the futility of ignoring the obvious, return Officer Williams to his rightful place on the police force, and allow him to finish his career with the dignity and respect he deserves.

 


[1] I also served as counsel for the BPPA in that arbitration case, written by a different, but equally prominent, arbitrator, Lawrence Holden.

Residency Victory For Massachusetts Coalition Of Police And The Lynn Police Association

After a nearly 20 year battle between the Lynn Police Association and the City of Lynn, the Appeals Court has finally confirmed that State Law, MGL c. 41 sec 99A, concerning the residency of police officers and fire fighters controls any residency obligations for police officers or firefighters and that a City Charter does not have any relevance or control.

In this case, the Appeals Court ruled that the Decision issued by the Superior Court in 2000 between the Lynn Police Association and the City of Lynn is controlling.  That Decision determined that MGL c. 41 sec 99A establishes residency as a term or condition of the employment of police officers and firefighters in Massachusetts and imposes a 15 mile statutory limit.  The only way that a City or Town can impose a more stringent residency requirement is through collective bargaining.  As Judge Grasso explained “the court finds an explicit indication of the legislature’s intent to tie local residency requirements to the collective bargaining process.”

Anticipating that the Appeals Court would agree with the Union and require bargaining over any residency requirement, the Union and the City bargained last year and reached agreement for the residency requirement for police officers in Lynn.  Officers must now maintain residency in Lynn for the first 10 years of their employment.

This Decision by the Appeals Court confirms that any municipal employer who wants to require residency for police officers or firefighters more stringent than the 15 mile requirement of MGL c. 41 sec 99A must bargain with the Union.

The case is City of Lynn vs. Lynn Police Association, 12-P-1122, issued March 27, 2013 pursuant to Rule 1:28.  The Union was represented by Sandulli Grace Attorneys Susan F. Horwitz and Jennifer Rubin.  Attorney Horwitz also represented the Union in the original Superior Court case in 2000.

Civil Service Overturns Discharges Of Six Boston Police Officers: Hair Testing Not Ready For Prime Time

In a landmark ruling with national and even international implications, the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission upheld the appeals of six former Boston Police Officers who had been fired solely because a California drug testing company (Psychemedics Corporation) claimed their hair samples showed they had ingested cocaine.  The 132 page decision, written by Commissioner Paul Stein, concluded that hair testing lacks the necessary reliability to be the sole basis for terminating a tenured Massachusetts civil servant:

The present state of hair testing for drugs of abuse, while potentially useful in clinical assessment settings, and in the context of child custody, criminal probation and pre-employment hiring decisions, does not meet the standard of reliability necessary to be routinely used as the sole grounds to terminate a tenured public employee under just cause standards governing civil service employees under Massachusetts law. [page 107]

Unfortunately, four other officers’ appeals were denied, although those cases stand to be appealed.  All appellants were represented by Sandulli Grace Attorneys Alan Shapiro and Jennifer Rubin and with the unflinching and steadfast support of their union, the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association (BPPA).

As thoroughly laid out in this sweeping and studiously crafted decision, the BPPA and the City of Boston/Boston Police Department, both desirous of maintaining a “zero-tolerance” policy for drug use, negotiated an annual hair testing policy, starting in 1999.  Because random urine testing was constitutionally impermissible under state law, the City/BPD sought an alternative testing modality.  At the time, the Union and the City/BPD believed the claims of Psychemedics Corporation that its hair tests could successfully ferret out illegal drug use going back months, as opposed to the hours or days of urine tests.  Urine testing was then, as it is now, the only approved testing method under the Mandatory Guidelines (covering approximately 10 million workers) of the Federal Drug-Free Workplace Program,

Under the hair testing protocol implemented by the Police Department, it collected a hair sample from every officer once a year, within 30 days of his/her birthday.  The sample was flown to the Psychemedics laboratory in California, where it was subjected to various laboratory tests and analyses, and then pronounced either positive or negative for various illegal drugs, including cocaine.  If deemed positive, the officer was given the opportunity to submit to Psychemedics a second hair sample, which was run through the same tests.  Unbeknownst to the Union (and probably, at least initially, the BPD), the second sample was declared a positive confirmation of the original sample if it had only 40% of the cocaine levels of the first sample.  Later, Psychemedics lowered the positive confirmation of the second (“safety net”) test to 4% of the level found in the original sample.

If an officer could not explain to a physician hired by the Department why s/he had tested positive (for cocaine there was virtually no explanation that would be accepted, since it is rarely utilized by physicians and other “caine” drugs, such as xylocaine or lidocaine, do not trigger cocaine positives), the officer was faced with the choice of termination or a 45-day suspension, mandatory drug counseling, and years of random urinalysis.  A second positive, either in a urine test or another hair test, resulted in termination.

From 1999 through 2006, approximately 90 officers tested positive for illegal drugs, most for cocaine.  Many accepted the 45-day suspensions and continued their careers.  Some accepted the suspensions and were later terminated for a second positive test.  Some, including 7 of the 10 officers involved in this case, refused to accept the suspensions for something they insisted they did not do and were terminated.

A key problem with hair testing that had only begun to emerge when BPD began this program is that hair absorbs certain substances, in particular cocaine, not just from internal consumption but also from external exposure.  While companies such as Psychemedics have developed elaborate laboratory procedures and mathematical formulae to eliminate the effects of external exposure, because the quantities at issue are so infinitesimal, there has yet to develop a scientific verification of their efficacy.  In other words, a positive hair test for cocaine can indicate external, atmospheric exposure, not necessarily ingestion.  The quantities being measured are on the scale of measuring one second over a period of 27 years.  In these quantities, scientific studies have shown measurable levels of cocaine in 92% of U.S. paper currency in five Ohio cities and on the school desks of elementary school children in both urban and suburban schools in the Washington D.C. area.

The BPPA’s initial attempts at challenging these decisions were largely unsuccessful.  Various arbitrators rejected challenges to the Psychemedics testing methodologies, including the use of the lowered standards for the “safety net test.”  But in 2003, in a decision written by former Commissioner Daniel Henderson, the Civil Service Commission overturned the discharge of an officer who refused to accept the 45-day suspension after Psychemedics claimed that his hair test positively confirmed that he had ingested cocaine.  Although the case was reversed and remanded in 2004 by a Superior Court judge on procedural grounds, several of Commissioner Henderson’s holdings proved prophetic, including the lowered safety net standard and the lack of acceptance in the scientific community for hair testing as the sole determinant of illegal drug ingestion.

In addition, many of the civil service appellants were also plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit contending that hair-testing is racially biased.  There, they were supported by the Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers (MAMLEO), and represented by attorneys from the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the Boston Bar Association, Inc., and by attorneys and staff at a large Boston law firm, Bingham McCutcheon.  Although the federal case was rejected at the trial level based on statistical analysis (an appeal is pending), the work of these attorneys provided valuable discovery that we were able to utilize in the civil service appeals.

By the time the Commission began the 18 days of hearing in October 2010, additional scientific evidence and other developments further challenged the efficacy of hair testing as a “stand alone” employment test.  Scientific studies done under grants by the U.S. Department of Justice caused the FBI to suspend using hair testing in all cases, except criminal cases involving children.  In addition, in 2008, after four years of study, the federal agency charged with overseeing the federal workplace drug programs rejected hair testing, leaving only urine testing as the approved testing modality.

Of enormous assistance to Attorneys Shapiro and Rubin at Sandulli Grace were two expert witnesses: Dr. Douglas Rollins and Dr. J. Michael Walsh.  Dr. Rollins, in addition to publishing numerous scientific papers regarding the incorporation of drugs into hair, had served as the medical review officer for drug testing in the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics.  Dr. Walsh served in both the Reagan and Clinton administrations and was an important contributor to the design and implementation of the federal workplace drug program.  Dr. Walsh’s company has since gone on to consult with numerous industries, including the National Football League.  Both experts challenged the BPD’s use of hair testing as a “stand alone” measurement.  Neither believe that hair testing has yet advanced to the level that, solely based on a hair test, an employer can conclusively state that an employee has ingested cocaine and proceed to fire him/her.  The Commission gave great weight to the testimony of these two scientists.

Supporting the BPD’s hair tests were Dr. Thomas Cairns, an employee of Psychemedics, and Dr. Leo Kadehjian, “a biochemist, with no direct drug testing experience or research credentials.”  (Decision at ¶131).  Although the decision did approvingly cite some of Dr. Kadehjian’s testimony, Commissioner Stein flatly rejected some of this expert’s opinions:

Where, however, the Appellants showed that the underlying source material on which Dr. Kadehjian relied did not support his opinions, I give those particular opinions no weight. For example, Dr. Kadehjian opined in his initial expert report that the SAMHSA “published” procedures for hair drug testing that, although not “formally implemented”, have “recognized the utility of hair as a suitable specimen . . . with the same level of confidence that has been applied to the use of urine”. The evidence showed that this opinion was hyperbole, at best, and possibly could be called misleading. Similarly, Dr. Kadehjian opined that “the United Nations has recognized the role of hair drug testing . . . and has provided hair testing guidelines.” In fact, the role that the UN recognized for hair drug testing was as “a complementary test for urinalysis”, not as a stand-alone test. Dr. Kadehjian?s outdated opinions about the scientific consensus CE as a distinct metabolic marker of ingestion were noted in the findings above on that subject. (¶132)

Sifting through the scientific evidence with extraordinary precision and intellectual energy, Commissioner Stein eventually concluded that while the Psychemedics hair tests could provide some evidence of illegal drug use, sole reliance on them as the basis for discharge does not meet the requisite “just cause” standard of the civil service law.

This finding has enormous consequences.  To date, we are unaware of any other case where the reliability of hair testing has been challenged, examined and litigated as it was in this case.  Psychemedics Corporation undoubtedly understood what was at stake, since a mini-phalanx of its executives and attorneys faithfully attended the hearings.[1]

      Where the decision breaks down is in the final result.  After finding that these hair tests did not suffice to establish just cause for discharge, the Commissioner parsed the extremely skimpy record to decide who should be believed and who not believed with respect to ingesting cocaine.  While a penetrating investigation might have been a valid inquiry by the BPD when it fired these officers between six and eleven years ago, it had never been done.  The BPD stipulated that the only reason it fired these officers, many of whom had spotless personnel records, some of which included medals for heroism, were the Psychemedics test results. 

Asked on the stand to speculate why they may have tested positive, some appellants recited situations where they had come into contact with cocaine, either at work or other locations.  In finding some of these explanations not credible, the Commission essentially was forcing the appellants to prove their innocence rather than insisting the BPD prove just cause.  There is no reliable scientific article which has yet to study, let alone pinpoint, the specific mechanisms by which cocaine permeates human hair.  Just as we know that cigarette smokers contract lung cancer in far greater percentages than non-smokers, we also know that some non-smokers also get lung cancer.  So too, we do not know why some react more than others to environmental cocaine exposure.  We know that darker hair, with more melanin, theoretically will bind more with cocaine, but this has received little study.

Therefore, a strong argument can be mounted that where the BPD relied solely on these hair tests, and these hair tests do not scientifically warrant such reliance, the BPD lacked just cause to terminate any of the appellants.

For the six successful appellants, there is also the limited remedy, extending back only to the beginning of the hearings.  If allowed to stand, this remedy would not only deprive these officers of lost earnings but also years of pension service credit – all due to no fault of their own.

While there will undoubtedly be further litigation, it is vital to recognize what has been accomplished.  Ten former officers, with the vital support of the BPPA, their union, stood up to not only their employer but also a multi-million dollar company, and six of them won.  Here is an excerpt from the Psychemedics web site:

Over the years, Psychemedics has performed millions [sic] employment-related hair tests, not including tests used in research, quality assurance, or other internal purposes. At Psychemedics, hair testing is not a sideline or one of many clinical offerings. Psychemedics specializes in hair analysis. We pioneered and developed hair testing in the workplace.

For over 25 years, Psychemedics has also successfully defended hair test results in lawsuits, union arbitrations, and government agency hearings. Our test has been routinely upheld in employment cases, where the test results generally stand alone as proof of drug use, as opposed to family court and child custody situations where the test result is usually only part of a number of pieces of evidence.

Now, there is one government agency hearing where the test results were not upheld as stand alone proof of drug use.



[1] At one point, an attorney representing Psychemedics made a caustic reference to Attorney Shapiro’s eating a bagel, perhaps under-appreciating the nutritional value of this food staple and overstating its cultural significance to his heritage.

Radio Broadcast On Medical Marijuana Features Sandulli Grace Attorney

Sandulli Grace attorney Bryan Decker was featured in a WBUR-FM radio broadcast regarding Massachusetts’ new medical marijuana law on Tuesday morning, February 19, 2013.  The report by WBUR radio journalist Martha Bebinger, explores various implications of the new law, including its effects on police officers, who are bound by federal laws making marijuana an illegal substance, and their families. “The federal law is the federal law,” Decker told Bebinger. “In Massachusetts, it is a job condition for police officers to carry a firearm. I think that is clear.”  A transcription of the story can be found here: http://www.wbur.org/2013/02/19/marijuana-laws.

DLR Institutes New “Unilateral Settlement” Procedure

Taking a page from the NLRB’s playbook, the Massachusetts Department of Labor Relations (DLR) recently added another technique to their skill set: the “Unilateral Settlement.”  In a case involving the City of Newton and the Newton Municipal Employees Association, MUP-09-5694 (June 26, 2012) (here), the DLR, in the first known instance of which we are aware, approved a ‘settlement’ without the express approval on the record of one of the parties.  (It is not clear whether or to what extent the ‘non-approving’ party may have informally agreed behind the scenes.)

The settlement includes a financial award and a posting.  The posting does not acknowledge liability, but sets out the affirmative action the employer will take and contains a statement by the employer agreeing not to violate Chapter 150E.

According to the Commission’s decision, the Unilateral Settlement procedure was as follows:  (1) after a Complaint issued, the City and the Union attempted to mediate the Union’s unfair labor practice charge, to no avail; (2) the City then presented the DLR with the last offer it had given the Union and asked the DLR to accept the proposal and dismiss the case; (3) the DLR then reviewed the proposal and determined that it “remedie[d] the allegations in the Complaint” and therefore “further proceedings … would not effectuate the purposes of the Law; and (4) the DLR then withdrew the Complaint.

The DLR found support for this procedure in M.G.L. c. 150E, s. 11(b), which permits the DLR to dismiss charges when further proceedings would not effectuate the purposes of the Law, and 456 CMR 15.04(1), which allows the DLR to withdraw Complaints previously issued when a charging party does not make reasonable efforts to resolve a matter.

It is not clear to what extent the DLR will be utilizing this new procedure, but it appears to be a sign that the Department’s already-intensive focus on mediation is not reducing the caseload as much as DLR officials would like.  The new practice raises a couple of questions: (1) How different may the settlement proposal be from what the charging party would obtain if it went forward and won?  It is not clear from the Newton case materials whether the financial figure, for example, was discounted in any way.  (2) Also, as mentioned above, how much input, if any, do charging parties have into these settlements?  Are these settlements to be imposed on unwilling participants, or will there be ‘behind the scenes’ discussions to assure at least a modicum of acquiescence?  (3) What are the appeal rights of charging parties, if any, after the DLR withdraws a complaint pursuant to a “Unilateral Settlement”?

These and other issues will surely be answered in the coming months and years.  We will try to keep you informed of new developments as they arise.

Plymouth Superior Court Judge Uphold’s MTA Local Union’s Arbitration Victory

A judge of the Plymouth Superior Court has upheld an arbitration award in a matter involving the Marshfield Education Association, MTA/NEA, and the Marshfield School Committee, which ordered the School Committee to reinstate a teacher who had been terminated for lacking a proper license. (A copy of the decision is here.) The case was briefed and argued at Superior Court by John M. Becker, an attorney with Sandulli Grace, P.C.

The case involves special education teacher Gerard O’Sullivan, who struggled for several years to obtain the proper approvals that would allow him to obtain licensure. At the final stages, he was thwarted by school administration officials, whose misunderstanding of the requirements caused delays that ultimately caused him his job. Most frustrating was the School Department’s insistence that classroom experience could not count for any of the credits required for the license, a stance that was directly contradicted by the state’s regulations. Once Mr. O’Sullivan realized he was not going to have his license in time for the new school year, and the School Department’s attempt to obtain a waiver had failed, he asked for a leave of absence so he could get his license, but even that request was denied, and he lost his job.

The arbitrator saw through the Department’s failures and determined that Mr. O’Sullivan should not have been fired, that he should be reinstated and granted the one-year leave of absence to obtain his license. (The arbitrator pointed out that the School Department had actually employed Mr. Sullivan without a license for a full year when a waiver request had been delayed, so it rejected the idea that he was ‘automatically’ fired once his waiver expired.)

Despite the courts’ deference to labor arbitrators, the School Committee challenged the arbitration award in court, alleging that it forced the School Committee to violate state law and public policy by requiring it to employ a teacher without a license. In a 17-page decision issued on September 18, 2012, Judge Robert C. Cosgrove ruled in the Union’s favor on all the School Committee’s arguments. He found that by reinstating Mr. O’Sullivan to a non-teaching, leave of absence position, the arbitrator was not violating any law requiring teachers to be licensed. He also found that, even though there is a public policy requiring teachers to be licensed, this arbitration award did not violate the policy because it was designed to help the teacher obtain his license without requiring him to teach any students while unlicensed.

The School Committee filed a notice of appeal of the Superior Court’s decision last week, so the matter is not over yet. As usual, employers seem to have a problem with the concept of “final and binding” arbitration. Stay tuned to this site for further developments.

Masscop Member Wins Extra Detail Opportunities After Arbitrator Finds Contract Violation

The Town of Bellingham must provide a police officer who was out on administrative leave with additional paid detail opportunities after an arbitrator found that the Police Department’s practice of giving “refusals” to such officers violated the collective bargaining agreement between the Town and the police union, Local 216 of the Massachusetts Coalition of Police. The union was represented by Attorney John M. Becker of Sandulli Grace, P.C.

The issue arose when the Police Chief decided to place the officer on administrative leave so he could send him for a fitness-for-duty examination. During the month-long leave period, the Department, according to a longstanding practice, recorded the officer as having refused every detail opportunity that he would have been offered had he been working. Such refusals placed the officer much lower on the list when he did return.

The Department had adopted this practice for officers on sick, injury and administrative leave to keep officers who were out for long periods from returning at the top of the detail list. The problem, the Union argued (and Arbitrator John Cochran agreed in an August 28, 2012 award), was that the clear language of the collective bargaining agreement stated that refusals were only appropriate when an officer was actually available to take the work and voluntarily refused. Thus, the practice of the Department violated the unambiguous language of the contract, and in such cases, the arbitrator ruled, the contract, not the practice, prevails. As a remedy, Arbitrator Cochran ordered the Department to give the officer another detail opportunity for each refusal he received.

In another portion of the case, the Town had argued that the grievance was not arbitrable because the Union had not filed for arbitration until 10 months after the contract violation. In this case, the contract language required the Union to give notice of intent to arbitrate within 14 days but had no deadline for actually filing for arbitration. Arbitrator Cochran agreed with an earlier arbitrator, who ruled that despite the absence of a strict time limit, the Union must file for arbitration within a “reasonable time” unless it had a good excuse for the delay. In this case, Arbitrator Cochran found that 10 months was unreasonable “on its face” but that the Union had a legitimate reason for waiting to file. The Union had also filed an unfair labor practice at the state Department of Labor Relations in relation to the same underlying facts as the grievance, and a win at the DLR would have given the officer the remedy he was looking for. But when the DLR dismissed a portion of the case, the Union realized it would have to go forward with the grievance in order for the officer to be made whole. Based on this explanation, Arbitrator let the grievance go forward on the merits and ultimately ruled in the Union’s favor on the detail refusal issue.

Sandulli Grace and MCOP Protect the Collective Bargaining Rights of Sergeants

Sandulli Grace, P.C. and the Massachusetts Coalition of Police are litigating two ULP cases this fall for police sergeants who have been the targets of retaliation for exercising their protected speech rights as union members.

The first is Town of Mansfield and Mansfield Police Association, MCOP Local 298, MUP-11-6146, which is scheduled for hearing on September 25, 2012.  The Mansfield Police Association represents patrol officers and sergeants.  Sergeant Tracey Juda was assigned to investigate an incident in which a patrol officer under her command was accused of misconduct.  In the process of investigating the incident, Sergeant Juda advised the officer to contact his union representative, and gave him an opportunity to do so.  Chief of Police Arthur O’Neill presented her with a written reprimand accusing her of incompetence and excoriating her for acting as a “union friend” rather than a sergeant by advising the officer to seek union representation. Sergeant Juda’s union filed a charge of prohibited practice, and the Department of Labor Relations issued a complaint alleging that the Chief of Police had retaliated against Sergeant Juda for her protected activity. (A copy of the Complaint of Prohibited Practice and the union’s charge may be viewed here.)

The second case to appear this fall is City of Attleboro and Attleboro Police Association, MCOP Local 352, MUP-11-1161, which is scheduled for hearing on October 16, 2012.  The Attleboro Police Association represents patrol officers, sergeants, lieutenants and captains.  In February 2011, the City fired a police officer based on the statements of a fellow officer.  Chief of Police Kyle Heagney told the fellow officer that he should obtain the investigation report leading to the termination, and the fellow officer submitted a public records request through Sergeant Michael McDonnell.  Sergeant McDonnell, perceiving that the Chief was pitting union members against each other to weaken the union’s defense of the terminated officer, advised the union president of the public records request.  The Chief issued Sergeant McDonnell a scathing reprimand, accusing him of “disloyalty,” saying that the union should not have been informed of the public records request, and punishing him for trying to “provide the union with some kind of advantage.” Sergeant McDonnell’s union filed a charge, and the Department of Labor Relations issued a complaint alleging that Chief Heagney had discriminated against Sergeant McDonnell for engaging in concerted, protected activity, and interfered with his exercise of rights protected under the law.  (A copy of the Complaint of Prohibited Practice and the union’s charge may be viewed here.)  The APA has two other ULP charges pending based on retaliatory conduct by Chief Heagney.  Those charges are still in the investigatory stage.

Every police officer has the right to encourage fellow officers to seek union assistance.  These Department of Labor Relations decisions support our belief that sergeants and other supervisory police personnel are entitled to the same collective bargaining and protected speech rights as non-supervisory employees.  Sandulli Grace, P.C. and MCOP will continue to advocate for their rights.

 

Leigh Panettiere, Esq.

Sandulli Grace, P.C.

Salem Mayor Again Found To Violate Union Contract And State Law

City of Salem, Mayor Driscoll continues to disregard her legal obligations to the City of Salem employees and its Unions.  In March 2012 an arbitrator found that the City of Salem violated the Salem Police Superior Officers contract and past practice when Mayor Driscoll refused to pay a Police Captain, retiring after 30 years of service to the City’s Police Department for the earned benefits which all other retirees had received for over 25 years.  The Mayor again disregarded her legal obligations when she removed Police Sergeant Peter Gifford from the Harbormaster position which he had held since 2001 and replaced him with a civilian employee.  This was done without any bargaining with the Union as is required by state law.  On August 24, 2012, the second arbitrator found, that based on 10 years of past practice that “the Superior Officers’  ‘own’ the Harbormaster work and the Employer is constrained from unilaterally removing that work from the bargaining unit.”  The Arbitrator also stated that the “City violated the collective bargaining agreement and state law when it removed Sergeant Peter Gifford from the position of Harbormaster and replaced him with a civilian, non bargaining unit employee.”

Therefore twice in one year the Mayor has been found by an arbitrator to be in violation of her legal obligations to the working men and women of the City of Salem.  By disregarding her legal obligations and ignoring the rights of the employees, the Mayor has also compelled the Salem Police Superior Officers Association and the City of Salem to expend its resources to fight over its employees clear rights.  The mayor’s approach is clearly wrong and it is not working. Hopefully, the Mayor will finally learn to show the Union workers some respect and will act to meet her legal and contractual obligations.

The Salem Police Superior Officers Association is a Local of the Massachusetts Coalition of Police (MCOP) and is represented by Sandulli Grace Attorney Susan Horwitz.