Category Archives: Employment Discrimination

FEDERAL COURT DISMISSES LAWSUIT AGAINST BROOKLINE FIREFIGHTERS’ UNION

On April 2, 2020, a federal court judge dismissed a discrimination lawsuit against Local 950, International Association of Firefighers (the Brookline firefighters’ union) brought by one of its members. In granting the Union’s motion for summary judgment in Alston v. Town of Brookline, NO. 15-13987-GAO, the Court (Judge George O’Toole) found that there is no genuine issue of material of fact between the parties that needs to be settled through a trial and the matter could be resolved as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the Plaintiff “fails to cite to competent, non-conclusory evidence in support of his objections to the defendant’s cited evidence.”

In 2015, the Plaintiff filed three federal civil rights claims against the Town of Brookline, various town officials, and the Union under Chapter 42, sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 of the U.S. Code. The gist of the claims was that the Union retaliated against the Plaintiff after he protested the discriminatory conduct of another Union member and that the Union failed to file grievances on his behalf because of his race. The Court rejected the 1983 claim, which requires government action, because, as the Court found, ““[t]he factual record does not support a conclusion that the Union was in any way acting under the color of state law… There is simply no evidence that would raise a genuine issue of fact that the Union became so allied with the Town’s actions toward [the Plaintiff] that it effectively became a state actor.” The Section 1985 claim, which requires a finding of a conspiracy between two or more parties, also failed after the Court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that the Union and the Town were conspiring against [the Plaintiff] to retaliate or discriminate against him” and “there is no evidence in the extensive record that could support a conclusion … that the Union conspired with [the Town] to deprive [the Plaintiff] of his rights.”

The Court also dismissed the Section 1981 claim. To state a claim under Section 1981 a plaintiff must show that they are a racial minority, that they were discriminated against on the basis of their race and that the discrimination implicated one of the activities enumerated in the statute. One activity is the enforcement of contracts; the Plaintiff alleged that the Union had failed to enforce its contract with him because of his race and in retaliation for protesting the actions of other Union members. The Court rejected the Section 1981 claim, noting that “[s]ubstantively, the record lacks evidence that … the Union retaliated against [the Plaintiff] for any protected activity or otherwise itself discriminated against [the Plaintiff] (emphasis included).” The Court noted that the Plaintiff did not approach the Union for assistance: “It cannot be said to have been materially discriminatory for the Union not to have acted when it appeared [the Plaintiff] did not want it to act on his behalf.” Judge O’Toole also pointed out that many of the allegations against the Union were barred by the statute of limitations because they occurred too far in the past.

In addition to dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims against the Union, the Federal Court also dismissed the claims against the Town of Brookline and individual Brookline officials. The Plaintiff has already filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, where the Court will review Judge O’Toole’s rulings. In the meantime, this victory for the Union is an affirmation of their consistent position that they fight hard for the benefit of their members – all their members – regardless of race, creed or color.

READ THE DECISION HERE

Sandulli Grace, P.C. and the Massachusetts Coalition of Police Present the next 2019 Training on December 4, 2019

Sandulli Grace, P.C. and the Massachusetts Coalition of Police are proud to announce our third 2019 police union training. Sandulli Grace and MassCOP believe in empowering MassCOP’s local unions through education, to create a stronger, safer environment for members. Our 2019 training sessions will give you tools to enforce your rights and improve your members’ working conditions.

Basics Trainings

In the past two years, MassCOP and Sandulli Grace have presented multiple “basics” trainings to our police unions. We believe there is a continued need for these trainings, as unions continue to elect new leaders, and new legal challenges present themselves every day. Topics include:

  • Grievance Processing
  • Discipline
  • Bargaining
  • Stress in the Workplace

Whether you are newly elected, or a seasoned union leader looking for ideas on how to make your job easier and more effective, these basics trainings can give you helpful information about issues that local unions face every day.

Bring Your Contract!

We intend this training to be interactive and practical, so we ask each person to please bring a copy of your collective bargaining agreement so that we can discuss real situations. PARTICIPATION IS NOT NECESSARY, BUT IT ADDS TO EVERYONE’S EXPERIENCE! WE STRONGLY ENCOURAGE IT! We will help you interpret your contract’s provisions on grievance processing and appealing discipline, and we will discuss what proposals you might want to make in your next round of bargaining.

How to Register

Our next 2019 training will be held on Wednesday, December 4, 2019 from 10:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m. at the American Legion Hall, 199 Federal Furnace Rd, Plymouth, MA 02360. Please see the attached flyer. The cost is $55 per person. Payment can be by check mailed to Gia Capozzi at Sandulli Grace, P.C., 44 School Street, Suite 1100, Boston, MA 02018, or by credit card at this link:
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/basics-training-2019-tickets-74856835811.

We welcome your feedback regarding the location and content of these training sessions. Please do not hesitate to contact us with questions or suggestions at gcapozzi@sandulligrace.com.

Download the event flyer

Equal Pay For Men And Women Doing Comparable Work: A New Massachusetts Law Takes Effect

On July 1, 2018 a new comprehensive pay equity law took effect in Massachusetts that seeks to eradicate the wage disparities between women and men working in the Commonwealth. See Mass. Gen. Laws c. 149, § 105A, as amended by St. 2016, c. 177, § 2. The new law, which amended an earlier version passed in 1945, is a comprehensive attempt to bring women’s wages to the same level as men’s. According to recent statistics, the average full-time working woman in Massachusetts makes only 84.3 % of the average full-time working man. In addition to making it easier for employees to make claims for unequal pay based on gender, the law also makes it unlawful for employers to prevent their employees from talking about their pay, and prohibits employers from asking about your pay history when you apply for a job.

To understand the background of this significant change in the law, it is necessary to go back to 1945, when Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to enact a law prohibiting employers from paying men and women differently for comparable work. St. 1945, c. 584, § 3. The only exception provided in the law was for pay differences based on seniority. In 1963, the federal government passed a narrower version of the law, which required equal pay for men and women, but only if they were doing equal work, that is, work that required “equal skill, effort, and responsibility” and was “performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d). The federal law had four exceptions: (1) seniority; (2) merit; (3) quantity or quality of production; or (4) “any other factor other than sex.”

After 1963, inquiring minds wanted to know: What’s the difference between the federal law (equal pay for equal work) and the earlier Massachusetts law (equal pay for comparable work)? In the 1990s, a group of food service workers in the Everett Public Schools, with the support of a union, the Massachusetts Teachers Association, decided to find out what “comparable” really meant. The food service workers, who were all women, claimed that they performed work that was comparable to the school janitors, who were all men, but were paid less. After a lengthy trial, a Superior Court judge found in favor of the food service workers. Applying the four-part test of the federal law, the judge found that the food service workers and the janitors performed work that required comparable skill, effort, responsibility and was performed under comparable working conditions. The judge ordered the employer to pay the food service workers the same as the janitors.

The School Committee appealed the decision to the Supreme Judicial Court, which reversed the lower court. The SJC in 1995 (and again in 1998) ruled that the judge had applied the wrong legal standard to the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act. See Jancey v. School Committee of Everett, 421 Mass. 482 (1995) and Jancey v. School Committee of Everett, 427 Mass. 603 (1998). According to the SJC, after applying the four-part test of the federal law, the judge should have applied a fifth test: Were the job duties of the positions being compared similar enough to make comparison practical? Janitors and food service workers have very different job duties, the SJC found, and the law was not intended to compare different types of jobs in this way.

Supporters of equal pay drafted legislation to overturn the result in Jancey, but it wasn’t until 2014 that their efforts came to fruition with the passage of An Act to Establish Pay Equity, which took effect at the beginning of this month. The law retains the standard of equal pay for comparable work, but it defines the standard in a way that removes the fifth test set out in Jancey and effectively overrules that case.

Under the new version of the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act (MEPA), nearly every employer in Massachusetts (except certain domestic and agricultural workers, and federal employees) must pay men and women the same in all aspects of wages and benefits if their jobs require comparable skill, effort and responsibility, and are performed under similar working conditions. There is no requirement that the difference in pay be intentional or the result of discriminatory animus; this is a strict liability standard. An aggrieved employee may file a complaint with the Attorney General or may go directly into Superior Court to challenge a violation of the law. The employee does not need to file a discrimination complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to challenge an equal pay violation. If the employee succeeds in proving a violation of the law, she is entitled to: (1) the difference in pay going back a maximum of three years; (2) an equal amount in liquidated damages; and (3) reasonable attorneys fees and costs. A complaint must be filed within three years of an employer’s action creating the pay discrepancy or within three years of the employee’s most recent paycheck. NOTE: The employer cannot eliminate gender-based differences in pay by reducing anyone’s pay.

While the new law gives MEPA new life after the Jancey case effectively killed it, it also gives employers new defenses that didn’t exist in the previous law. For example, a difference in pay between men and women does not violate MEPA if it is made pursuant to any of the following reasons:

  1. a seniority system (but employee seniority can’t be affected by pregnancy or family and medical leave);
  2. a merit system;
  3. a system that rewards quality or quantity of production;
  4. the geographic location of the work (if based on legitimate regional differences);
  5. education, training or experience (if reasonably related to the job); or
  6. travel (if travel is a regular and necessary aspect of the job; commuting not included).

There is also an affirmative defense in the law for employers, who can successfully oppose a MEPA claim if they can show:

  1. They conducted a good faith, reasonable self-evaluation of their pay practices;
  2. The evaluation is reasonable in detail and scope;
  3. The evaluation was conducted within three years prior to the filing of the complaint; and
  4. The employer can show reasonable progress towards eliminating any gender-based wage differentials revealed by the evaluation.

In addition to toughening up MEPA, the new law also includes provisions regarding employee and employer discussions of pay and pay history. The law requires employers to allow their employees to discuss their pay with co-workers, or anyone else, for that matter. (The idea here is that allowing employers to gag their employees allows the perpetuation of discriminatory pay practices.) At the same time, the law prohibits employers from disclosing employee pay and salary information to others unless (1) the employee affirmatively consents or (2) the information is a public record, as with public employees.

Furthermore, the law attempts to cut down on the perpetuation of discriminatory practices by prohibiting employers from asking prospective employees about their past salary or salary history. There are exceptions here too:

  1. the employer can confirm prior wage history with former employers if the prospective employee voluntarily provides information about prior pay;
  2. the employer can ask a prospective employee his or her salary expectations for the new position, as long as it doesn’t ask where the expectation came from; and
  3. the employer can ask for prior pay information once it has made a job offer with a compensation package.

For more detailed information about the new law, see the Attorney General’s Overview and Frequently Asked Questions.

The passage of the new, improved MEPA proves that where there is significant opposition to a court interpretation of a law, the legislative process, while sometimes slow, can act to amend the law and effectively overrule the court. Although the neutrality of the court system and its ability to interpret the laws remain intact, the democratically-elected representatives of the people get the last word.