Masscop Members In Rockport Win Back National Guard Pay Benefit – Arbitrator Rejects Town’s Argument That Payments Are Unlawful.

Arbitrator Richard Boulanger handed a significant victory to Local 154 (Rockport) of the Massachusetts Coalition of Police, AFL-CIO (“Union”) on August 3, 2016 when he sustained a grievance over pay cuts by the Town of Rockport (“Town”) for officers attending National Guard training. In doing so, Arbitrator Boulanger rejected the Town’s argument that it could not legally pay officers their full pay during National Guard training.

Two Rockport police officers who served in the National Guard and had been receiving full pay while attending mandatory military training were informed in January 2015 that the Town would now be deducting their National Guard military allowances from their pay, because, the Town claimed, to do otherwise would be illegal. The Union filed a grievance over the pay cut, which proceeded to a hearing before Arbitrator Boulanger. The Massachusetts Coalition of Police provided legal support by assigning Attorney John M. Becker, of Sandulli Grace, P.C., to represent Local 154 and the two grievants.

In his decision [which may be found HERE], Arbitrator Boulanger recognized that the Town had established a past practice of paying employees who were members of the National Guard their full pay while on leave attending mandatory training, without deducting the military allowance the employees received. The practice was encompassed by the strong maintenance of benefits provision in the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the Town and the Union, which protects any job benefit that (1) existed in the past and (2) has not been contractually modified, even if it is not mentioned in the CBA.

Boulanger rejected the Town’s argument that paying officers without deducting military allowances violated the law. Boulanger reviewed four statutes relating to military pay. First, the federal military leave law, USERRA, does not contain any provisions regarding pay during National Guard training, and so was irrelevant. Of three state statutes with some relevancy, none actually applied to this case, Arbitrator Boulanger concluded. G.L. c. 149, § 52a, which had previously provided for 17 days of military training leave to members of the reserves, which could be “paid or unpaid at the Town’s discretion”, was repealed in 2014 and was no longer good law. Chapter 137 of the Acts of 2003, a local option law that the Town had adopted, allows for paying regular base salary without loss of leave or seniority, but minus any military pay or allowance, for officers in “active service.” But as Arbitrator Boulanger pointed out, the statute is inapplicable because the officers in this case were not in “active service” and National Guard training is specifically excluded from the scope of the law. The Town had not adopted G.L. c. 33, § 59, a local option law, but Arbitrator Boulanger found that statute to be the most relevant. If adopted, the law (as amended in 2014) requires municipalities to give employees in the armed forces full pay without deducting for military stipends or pay during training, for up to 34 days in a state fiscal year or 17 days in a federal fiscal year, without loss of seniority or accrued leave. Boulanger pointed out that, although the Town had not adopted G.L. c. 33, § 59, it had adopted Chapter 137 of the Acts of 2003, which provides that it “shall not limit or reduce a person’s entitlement to benefits under [G.L. c. 33, § 59].”

Ultimately, Arbitrator Boulanger concluded that, while no statute specifically authorized the Town to pay full pay to employees during National Guard training, no statute prohibited the payments either, so the past practice of the Town – which was fully consistent with the local option law, G.L. c. 33, § 59 – was lawful and enforceable. For these reasons, the Arbitrator sustained the grievance and ordered the Town of Rockport to pay the police officers full pay during military training without deducting military allowances going forward and pay the officer back pay to make them whole from the time their pay was cut in January 2015.

Appeals Court Upholds Power of Arbitrators to Decide Whether a Teacher has Professional Teacher Status

Today, the Appeals Court issued a decision holding that arbitrators, acting pursuant to their authority under G.L. c. 71, § 42, have the authority to determine if a dismissed teacher held professional teacher status at the time of his/her dismissal. Under G.L. c. 71, § 42, teachers who have three consecutive years of service with a school district are entitled to professional teacher status, which confers upon them certain procedural and substantive rights, including the right to challenge their dismissals before an arbitrator under a just cause standard.

The case, Plymouth Public Schools vs. Education Association of Plymouth, involved a special education teacher, who worked for the school district for five years. During those five years, the teacher took maternity leave twice, under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). At the end of her fifth year, the school district notified her of its decision not to renew her for the upcoming year. The district believed that the teacher had not obtained professional teacher status because her service was interrupted by the two periods of maternity leave. The teacher and the union took the position that she had acquired professional teacher status by virtue of her five years as an employee of the school district. Accordingly, the union petitioned the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education for arbitration. The Commissioner forwarded the petition to the American Arbitration Association for an arbitration to determine first, whether the teacher had professional teacher status, and, if she did, whether or not the district had just cause to terminate her employment.

The district filed suit in Superior Court. There, the district argued that the teacher did not have professional teacher status, that she had no right to arbitrate her dismissal, and that the question of whether or not she had professional teacher status could only be answered by the courts, rather than by an arbitrator. After the Superior Court ruled in the district’s favor, the teacher and the union appealed to the Appeals Court. The Appeals Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and declined to decide whether or not the teacher had professional teacher status. In doing so, the Court ruled that the question of whether or not she had professional teacher status was one appropriately answered by an arbitrator, rather than the courts. As a result, the dismissal will be reviewed by an arbitrator who will have the power to determine whether the teacher had professional teacher status and, if so, whether she was dismissed for just cause. Had the court not decided in the union’s favor, teachers in a similar position would have to file suit in court to determine their professional teacher status, and then, if the court ruled in their favor, proceed to arbitration to obtain a determination on the merits of their dismissal. This decision reaffirms the Legislature’s intent to have arbitrators decide issues relating to the termination of teachers and avoids forcing teachers into costly, duplicative litigation.

The case was successfully litigated by Atty. Matthew Jones of the Legal Services division of the Massachusetts Teachers Association.

Here is a link to the decision.

Public Records Law Overhauled For First Time In 43 Years

The state’s public records law was updated today for the first time in 43 years. The new law, “An Act to Improve Public Records,” puts pressure on municipalities and agencies to respond quickly and adequately to public record requests by establishing strict timeline requirements and allowing for significant judicial measures in the event of noncompliance.

Most notably, the law allows judges to award attorney fees and costs, as well as punitive damages up to $5,000 for a lack of good faith, to requesters who succeed in court against an agency or municipality that fails to produce records according to the statute. This change accompanies a new timeframe for responding to requests. Like the current law, the new law requires a response within 10 business days. However, the new law will require a municipality or agency, if it cannot produce the requested records, to identify a reasonable timeframe for turning them over. That timeframe cannot exceed 15 days for an agency and 25 days for a municipality following the initial receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed to by the requestor.

Additional provisions call for the use of electronic and digital transmission of records when possible (preferably in ‘searchable’ form), the designation of one or more employees as ‘records access officers,’ and the creation of a Public Records Assistance Fund. Further, agencies must host websites providing records of proceedings, annual reports, winning bids for public contracts, grant awards, agency budgets, minutes of open meetings, and more.

The law specifically clarifies that personal information of law enforcement and public safety personnel, including their home address, personal email address, and home telephone number, “shall not be public records” and “shall not be disclosed,” with limited exceptions that include requests made by public employee organizations such as unions. Section 10B. Similar personal information relating to family members of law enforcement and public safety personnel are explicitly not public records and should never be disclosed, without exception. Id.

The bill, House No. H.4333, passed unanimously in both the House and Senate on Wednesday and signed today by the governor, after being formed as a result of a compromise between two bills originating separately in each chamber. Most of the provisions of the new law take effect on January 1, 2017.

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Reverses District Court’s “Deflategate” Decision, Reinstates Brady’s Suspension

By a 2-1 decision, a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned District Court Judge Richard Berman’s decision that overturned the NFL’s suspension of New England Patriots’ quarterback Tom Brady.

In its decision, the majority held that Judge Berman ignored the exceptional deference federal law afford decisions of labor arbitrators and acted beyond the narrow scope of review federal courts are required to adhere to. Specifically, the Court held that in suspending Brady, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell properly exercised the broad discretion given to him by Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement to suspend players for “conduct detrimental” to the NFL and/or the integrity of the game.

In its decision, the Court highlighted and rejected each of the three bases upon which Judge Berman overturned Brady’s suspension: 1) that Brady was not given proper notice that his actions could result in a four-game suspension, 2) that testimony excluded from the arbitration made the decision fundamentally unfair, and 3) that the NFL’s denial of access to the investigative notes from the NFL’s General Counsel also amounted to fundamental unfairness. In the case of each, the Court ruled that Judge Berman acted beyond his authority and did not afford Goodell’s decision the deference it was entitled to under the federal Labor Management Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court noted that under federal law, so long as the arbitrator is “even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority” the decision must be upheld, and that a judge cannot simply substitute his judgment for that of the arbitrator.

It is worth noting that the point of controversy which received a large bulk of the media attention in this case, that Goodell was able to serve as arbitrator in a dispute involving discipline he himself meted out, was a relatively minor issue to the Court. The Court that found this arrangement is extremely unusual, but noted that it was the process explicitly called for by the collective bargaining agreement. This is consistent with a long line of cases emphasizing that when parties to a collective bargaining agreement agree to a grievance process which ends in final and binding arbitration, that the decision of an arbitrator should be just that: final, binding, and free from interference by the courts. It seems that if the NFL and the NFL Players Association are to fix what many agree is a broken system of disciplinary appeals, they will have to do so at the bargaining table, rather than in a courthouse.

What People Say When They Get Arrested

The Boston Globe has a front page story on April 10 titled “Arresting Words.” Written by columnist Yvonne Abraham, the story weaves the words from Boston police reports into a tapestry of what police officers face daily on the streets and in the health clinics and within the homes of people to whom they are called to respond. Most are poor, many suffer from mental or physical illness, some are violent or threaten violence.

We see and hear a lot about victims of police abuse. This story gives some small bit of insight into the world into which society sends its police officers. Perhaps because it thrives on sensationalism, the press usually fails to convey a true picture of the milieu in which police officers work. Police must at once be legal experts and social workers. Split second decisions are parsed by appellate judges and clinical psychologists years later, but only after they have spent weeks, months, and years poring over enormous amounts of data, much of which the officer on the scene had no knowledge of in the moment.

And how does society value the men and women in police work? It compensates them like other public employees – fire fighters, teachers, sanitation workers – but nowhere near the level of the judges or bureaucrats who sit in judgment over therm.

One would think that having an educated police force would be a good idea. In fact, in 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (the Johnson Crime Commission) recommended more education for police officers. Massachusetts responded in 1970 by passing the Quinn Bill, now known as the Police Career Incentive Pay Program, codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 149, Section 108L. A local option law, it provided additional compensation ranging from 10% to 20% to 25% for an Associates’, Bachelor’s, and Masters/JD degree. When many municipalities accepted the program, thousands of police officers seized the incentive to gain college degrees. But the program’s Achilles heel was that, although its cost was supposed to be split between the state and the community, starting in the late 1980’s and continuing to the present day, the Legislature has underfunded the program to the point that it makes virtually no contribution to its one-half share.

In Boston, where one would think educated police officers would be a priority, the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association and the City had negotiated for this benefit in 1998. But when the Commonwealth underfunded the program in 2009, the City simply shortchanged its educated police officers, reducing their salaries by thousands of dollars. The Supreme Judicial Court, which has no problem opining on the lofty standards to which police are held (“it is extremely important for the police to gain and preserve public trust, maintain public confidence, and avoid an abuse of power by law enforcement officials.” 1 ) voted unanimously to uphold these pay cuts for educated police officers.

The current solution to address police abuse is to put body cameras on police officers. If and when that happens, and if people actually watch 99+% of what the police see, they will perhaps gain some insight into the world into which this Globe article peers. As one veteran officer remarked to me, people would be horrified to actually have to look at some of what police see on a daily basis. He mentioned entering a house where multiple people and domestic animals had relieved themselves everywhere, creating a visual and olfactory experience that could only induce nausea.

The social and economic conditions depicted in this column were not created by the police. But it is the police who must spend much of their working lives dealing with them. As Jesse Jackson has written,

The president has created a Task Force on 21st Century Policy, with instructions to report in 90 days. He’s committed millions to put cameras on police. But he might be better advised to put cameras on bankers.

By putting this article on its front page, the Globe perhaps opened a few readers’ eyes. But there is much more that must be done

1 City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 443 Mass. 813 (2005)

SJC Determines That State Pension Forfeiture Statute Is A Fine, Subject To The Eighth Amendment

The Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) is a fine and therefore subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment of the United States’ Constitution. Section 15(4) provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s pension and health insurance benefits if he/she is convicted of a crime relating to his/her position. The Court’s decision means that individuals convicted of minor crimes may not be subject to a complete forfeiture of their pension and retiree health insurance.

The case, Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission v. Bettencourt, involved, a lieutenant and twenty-five year veteran of the Peabody Police Department, who was convicted of twenty-one counts of unauthorized access of a computer system. Shortly after his conviction (which has since been appealed), the lieutenant applied for a superannuation retirement. However, as a result of the conviction, the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (“PERAC”) denied his application on the grounds that his retirement benefits and continuing health insurance were forfeited under G.L. c. 32, § 15(4). The issue before the Court was whether Section 15(4), as applied to this officer’s case, was an excessive fine under the Eight Amendment of the United States’ Constitution.

In determining that the forfeiture was an excessive fine, the Court held that Bettencourt had a property interest in his retirement benefits, that the forfeiture was a punishment (and hence, a fine), and that the fine as applied to him was disproportionate to the harm caused by the crimes for which he was convicted. As a result, the Court ruled that Section 15(4)’s forfeiture would not apply to Bettencourt’s pension and health insurance, allowing him to receive both in their entirety. Rather than determine what a non-excessive fine would be in this case, the Court deferred to the Legislature to determine how cases such as Bettencourt’s would be handled after forfeiture is deemed to be excessive.

This case is an important one, as the Court held for the first time that forfeiture under G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) is a fine subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment. While the case did not strike down Section 15(4), unless and until the Legislature answers the Court’s call to create a remedy for individuals who have been excessively fined under Section 15(4), excessive forfeitures should result in an employee receiving the entirety of their retirement and health insurances benefits.

You can find the case details here.

Masscop Prevails In Arbitration Of Injury That Re-Emerged Twenty Four Years Later

On February 22, 2016, Arbitrator Marc Greenbaum issued an injury leave award in favor of Mass Coaltion of Police and Rehoboth Police Lt. Bruce Dube. A copy of the Award is attached. Mass COPs case was presented and argued by Sandulli Grace Attorney Amy Laura Davidson.

The case involved a reoccurrence and exacerbation of a previous injury that Lt. Dube had suffered in a cruiser accident in 1990. The accident damaged one of his cranial nerves causing him to have double vision. He was able to compensate for it for many years by tilting his head or blinking. Last December, Bruce’s condition deteriorated and he was no longer able to compensate for the double vision.

Lt. Dube had 27 years of unblemished service. He rose through the ranks to Lieutenant. The medical evidence that his condition was work related was uncontroverted. Even the Town’s doctor found that to be the case. Although the Chief originally placed Bruce on IOD, he reversed that decision and deducted his sick leave back to February 2015. The Town dragged its feet causing Lt. Dube to run out of all of his accumulated sick and vacation time. He went off the payroll in early December 2015 and remained so until the Award issued.

Arbitrator Greenbaum issued his award in under two weeks. He found that the Town violated the contract by failing to place Lt. Dube on injured on duty leave. He also held that the Town violated the contract by switching Bruce’s shift assignment to the day shift while he was incapacitated resulting in a loss of @ $95/week. Arbitrator Greenbaum issued a make whole order requiring the Town to restore all the accumulated time that Bruce was forced to use, compensate him for back pay and place him on IOD status going forward.

The parties are currently engaged in discussions about the damages owed under the Award. The amount owed is in excess of $50,000. In addition, the Town has agreed to reimburse Lt Dube nearly $9,000 for the taxes that were unlawfully withheld from his pay while he was incapacitated.

Read the arbitrator’s award.

43rd Annual Workshop for Public Sector Labor Relations Specialists

On Saturday May 7th, the Boston Bar Association will be holding its 43rd Annual Workshop for Public Sector Labor Relations Specialists at Langdell Hall, Harvard Law School. The program is designed to familiarize lay people and attorneys who specialize in labor relations with current trends in collective bargaining and other issues affecting public employees. This year’s program features a review of significant labor law decisions issued in the past year followed by a panel of representatives from the Department of Labor Relations and the Joint Labor Management Committee who will review recent developments in their agencies. A second panel addresses the perils and pitfalls of workplace investigations including Weingarten and Fifth Amendment Rights. The conference is co-chaired by Amy Laura Davidson of Sandulli Grace, P. C., Brian Magner of Deutsch, Williams, Brooks, DeRensis & Holland, P. C., and Suffolk University Professor of Law Marc Greenbaum.

The Supreme Court Hands Down An Unexpected Public Sector Union Victory

An evenly divided Supreme Court upheld a ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling supporting the right of public sector unions to collect fair share fees from employees they represent who are not members of the union. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. The result leaves intact a near 40 year old precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. Abood held that the First Amendment only applies to forced contributions to the union’s political activities. Public sector unions are the exclusive representative and are bound by a duty of fair representation to all bargaining unit members without regard to their union membership. Accordingly, the Court in Abood held that non-members should be required to pay their fair share of the costs of negotiating and administering the contract on their behalf.

Conservative antiunion organizations have been trying to get the Court to overturn Abood since it issued in 1977, whittling down it principles by imposing increasing burdens on unions seeking to collect fair share fees from non-members. When Friedrichs was argued on January 11th the Court seemed poised to overrule precedent. The conservative Justices expressed skepticism about virtually all of the major arguments proffered in support of fair share fees. It seemed almost certain that the high court would rule 5-4 that fair share fees are unconstitutional. But with Justice Scalia’s death there were no longer five justices to do so.

The result of the ruling is a victory for unions. But the decision was a one sentence opinion affirming the 9th Circuit “by an equally divided Court.” It does not set precedent at the Supreme Court level. The next appointment to the Court will have considerable power over this critical issue which undoubtedly will be raised again.

Appeals Court Upholds Arbitrator’s Award Reinstating Employee, Even Where Arbitrator Found He Sexually Harassed A Co-Worker

The Massachusetts Appeals Court today upheld an arbitrator’s reinstatement of a City of Springfield employee who was found to have sexually harassed a co-worker. The case is City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Unions, No. 15-P-742. The three judge panel, adhering to the high deference afforded an arbitrator’s decision, refused to find that the award violated public policy. The court found that while there is certainly a strong public policy against sexual harassment, the reinstatement of the grievant did not violate that public policy as he was still subject to remedial action for his behavior.

The grievant, a twenty-two year employee of the Springfield housing office with an “unblemished” record, was a messenger for the office. He suffers from “significant physical and mental health problems” and has a “mildly impaired overall [IQ] of 74.” He was fired over one incident, in which he made lewd statements and gestures toward a female employee, causing her significant upset. His union filed a grievance, and following a two day hearing, an arbitrator found that there was not just cause for the termination, and ordered him “reinstated to his position without loss of compensation or other rights.” The arbitrator found that the grievant’s conduct did amount to sexual harassment, but that termination was not justified. The arbitrator based her decision on the grievant’s work history, his physical and mental limitations, and also on the fact that another employee “engaged in a six-month course of sexual harassment directed at a co-worker” and received only a reprimand.

The City first claimed that the failure to uphold termination violates public policy. The court quickly rejected this, pointing out that employers are not required to terminate an employee who sexually harasses another employee, as long as other “appropriate remedial action” is taken. The City next claimed that the award violated public policy in that it ordered the grievant reinstated with no loss of compensation. The City argued that public policy required a sexual harasser to be punished in some way. The Court rejected this argument, noting that “counseling and training” are appropriate remedial responses to sexual harassment, and that the arbitrator’s award did not impede the employer’s right to require such. Again properly noting its limited role in review of an arbitrator, the panel noted that upholding the award “does not suggest that we agree with the arbitrator’s resolution of the matter without loss of compensation or other employment rights, as ‘even our strong disagreement with the result [would] not provide sufficient grounds for vacating the arbitrator’s award.”

The Court’s decision in this case again demonstrates that arbitrator’s awards are subject to great deference on review. Judges properly uphold such awards, even when they disagree with them, as the parties to an arbitration agreement have submitted to the “final and binding” nature of the process.

Read the decision.