Radio Broadcast On Medical Marijuana Features Sandulli Grace Attorney

Sandulli Grace attorney Bryan Decker was featured in a WBUR-FM radio broadcast regarding Massachusetts’ new medical marijuana law on Tuesday morning, February 19, 2013.  The report by WBUR radio journalist Martha Bebinger, explores various implications of the new law, including its effects on police officers, who are bound by federal laws making marijuana an illegal substance, and their families. “The federal law is the federal law,” Decker told Bebinger. “In Massachusetts, it is a job condition for police officers to carry a firearm. I think that is clear.”  A transcription of the story can be found here: http://www.wbur.org/2013/02/19/marijuana-laws.

You Must Remember This: Memory And Truthtelling

In Andrew Lloyd Webber’s musical Jesus Christ Superstar, Pontius Pilate asks his most famous prisoner, “And what is ‘truth’? Is truth unchanging law? We both have truths. Are mine the same as yours?”  Pilate’s questions could just as well be asked in any discussion of witness testimony in legal proceedings, because the truth about the truth is that it is not a fixed and stable entity – modern science is showing us more and more that witnesses who testify honestly may not be telling the truth.

Lawyers seeking to combat the testimony of an opposing eyewitness do so through the tool of cross-examination.  There are a couple of common approaches: (1) try to show the witness is lying; and (2) try to show the witness didn’t really witness the relevant event or action.  Under the first approach, the lawyer will attempt to trip up the witness on specific facts, confront him with contradictory evidence, or show that he is biased in some way.  The second approach focuses on perception and asks such questions as: Was the witness physically able to see, hear or otherwise perceive what was happening? and Was the witness impaired in any way from making accurate observations?

Lawyers have been using these techniques for centuries, but recent scientific discoveries about the nature of memory have raised a new and potentially explosive issue, one that applies even when the witness is not lying and when the witness fully perceived the relevant incident.  According to the most recent studies, our memories may have little or no relationship to the events that we purport to remember.  These scientists tell us that many individuals who ‘remember’ something they observed or experienced are not lying, but neither are they accurately reporting the events they observed.

For centuries, the common sense view of memory has been that when we experience or observe something, it is recorded in our brain accurately, like a videocamera records an event (although there are problems with this analogy because videos have their own limitations, which will be the subject of a future blog entry).  There in our brains these billions of videotapes reside, waiting for something to trigger a “memory”, which, we think, means the tape is played.  There are variations in quality and reception, and how easily accessible the tapes are.  We do acknowledge that some people have better memories than others, and some people have something we call ‘photographic memories.’  But by and large the assumption is that the true, accurate memories are there, encoded in neuron pathways – it’s just that some are better than others in retrieving them.  This view was supported by some experiments performed on patients during brain surgery, when doctors would poke a site in the patient’s brain and all of a sudden she would vividly remember an incident from her past, complete with sights, sounds and smells.  For a time, some scientists believed that inside your head you might have the complete, accurate story of your past – just waiting for the technology to download it onto a boxed set of DVDs.

But more recent studies have erased this view and forced us to rewind our thoughts about memory.  Apparently memories, far from being etched in neural stone, are very susceptible to changes – changes that we or others may bring about, either intentionally or not.  The modern view is that each memory is a kind of computer file – when we retrieve the memory file from storage, it must be reconstructed according to a set of instructions – this reconstruction process makes the memory vulnerable to alterations.  Any alterations, additions or deletions to the memory then become part of the file, which is then stored in its new form.  The original file has been overwritten and is no more.  A part of our past is forever changed.  Scientists say that the more a person recalls a memory, the more likely that it will be changed over time.  The only pure unadulterated memory, they say, is one that has never been remembered.

What causes alterations in your memories?  Our psychologies are so complex that the answer is, almost anything.  It could be as simple as a ‘bug’ in the instructions for reconstructing your memory  that leaves something out, or takes a piece of one memory and inserts it in another.  It could be new information – someone tells you your grandmother was there on your 10th birthday and you “remember” her being there, or you see an old picture and your brain incorporates the information in the photo into the memory the next time you recall it.  In cases involving child abuse, some investigators and therapists have been accused of planting false memories through the power of suggestion.  Or it could be a feeling – guilt, resentment, shame – that leads one’s unconscious to erase some portion of a memory.

Several years ago, at a Boston Bar Association seminar on witness testimony, an arbitrator on the panel told the story of the day he left the house with a legal document in his hand, drove around town doing various errands before finally sitting down to work on the document, which he then couldn’t find.  He retraced his steps to every location he had been to since he left his house, but no document.  Frustrated, he returned home  – to find the document sitting on his desk.  He had never taken it out of the house to begin with, yet he had a vivid memory of having the document with him throughout the entire trip.  Why did the arbitrator’s memory insert the document where it didn’t belong?  Maybe it was a matter of wishful thinking – he believed he should have brought the document with him, so in order to avoid a bad feeling about forgetting it, his brain simply added the document to his memories.

The bottom line of this new research, as the arbitrator’s story highlights, is that a witness may not be telling the truth, but may not be lying either.  The old saying that ‘true fact’ is redundant may have to be revised.  The facts of a case are what the finder of fact says they are.  If an uncontradicted witness testifies without lying to a set of facts that are credited by the factfinder, those are the facts, but there is no guarantee that they are true.  Where does that leave the search for the truth?  In the 1700s, British philosopher George Berkeley concluded that nothing existed unless it was being perceived by someone.  In order to avoid a world in which objects come in and out of being every time you close your eyes, Berkeley concluded that God was perceiving everything all the time.  Berkeley’s theory has long since been debunked, but the new science of memory may require its resurrection.  For if we cannot rely on the memories of credible, truth-telling witnesses as an accurate reflection of what they have observed and experienced, how can a legal factfinder ever find out what truly happened?  As advocates, perhaps the best we can do is educate factfinders – and witnesses, for that matter – about the elusive nature of memory.

Medical Marijuana – Not for Cops?

(Please note, a version of this article will appear in the upcoming edition of the Pax Centurion, the paper of the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, a client of Sandulli Grace, PC)

As I’m sure you are aware, Massachusetts voters approved a medical marijuana ballot question last November.  Despite inaction from Beacon Hill or the executive in the form of regulations regarding the new law, it went into effect on January 1.  So, Massachusetts residents may now become medical marijuana users.  However, before making a run on the Doritos in the vending machine at the station, officers should be aware that many departments are already taking steps to prohibit sworn police officers from using medical marijuana.  The purported basis for this action is that the drug remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law.

Several departments have put forth detailed, and very similar draft policies, leading to speculation that the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association or another management group is coordinating a response.  Whatever the reason, this issue is one that all police unions in the state will likely need to address.

The ballot question which passed last year sets up a registration system whereby “qualifying patients” apply for a “registration card” to be issued by the state Department of Public Health allowing them to grow and/or possess a “sixty-day supply” of marijuana.  Under the law “a ‘Qualifying patient’ shall mean a person who has been diagnosed by a licensed physician as having a debilitating medical condition.”  A “debilitating medical condition” is one of a number of conditions or “other conditions as determined in writing by a qualifying patient’s physician.”  A “‘ sixty day supply’ means that amount of marijuana that a qualifying patient would reasonably be expected to need over a period of sixty days for their personal medical use.’”  In addition to defining qualifying patients, the statute also anticipates that others will care for the patients.  A “‘personal caregiver’ shall mean a person who is at least twenty-one (21) years old who has agreed to assist with a qualifying patient’s medical use of marijuana. Personal caregivers are prohibited from consuming marijuana obtained for the personal, medical use of the qualifying patient.’”

As a union lawyer, I won’t attempt to get into the law enforcement implications of the medical marijuana law.  However, the employment implications are obvious – what if an officer, or an officer’s loved one, seeks to become a medical marijuana user?  Many departments are already announcing an intention to “Just Say No!”

The purported ability of departments to prohibit officers from becoming medical marijuana users is the federal classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance.  While this may be enough to prohibit medical marijuana use, such use may also prevent officers from lawfully possessing a firearm, which would lead departments to contend that they are ineligible to be officers.  Specifically, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has issued an “Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees” indicating that the DOJ takes the position that medical marijuana users are prohibited from possessing firearms.  The Letter, issued in September, 2011, over a year before the Massachusetts vote, states in relevant part:

A number of States have passed legislation allowing under State law the use or possession of marijuana for medicinal purposes, and some of these States issue a card authorizing the holder to use or possess marijuana under State law…

As you know, Federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), prohibits any person who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) from shipping, transporting, receiving or possessing firearms or ammunition. Marijuana is listed in the Controlled Substances Act as a Schedule I controlled substance, and there are no exceptions in Federal law for marijuana purportedly used for medicinal purposes, even if such use is sanctioned by State law…

Therefore, any person who uses or is addicted to marijuana, regardless of whether his or her State has passed legislation authorizing marijuana use for medicinal purposes, is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance, and is prohibited by Federal law from possessing firearms or ammunition.

Therefore, departments are likely to take the position that officers may not be medical marijuana users, as such a status would revoke their right to possess a firearm, which is a condition of employment.

Even apart from the question of whether an officer may be a “qualified patient,” it is likely that departments will further seek to prohibit officers from being “personal caregivers.”  While personal caregivers are not marijuana users, under the definition in the statute it is likely that they will possess marijuana.  Again, marijuana possession remains a federal crime.  Given the amount of federal money relied upon by most departments, departments will likely want to prohibit officers from engaging in activities that in any way violate federal law.

Finally, at least one department has proposed a rule that an officer must notify the department if any member of his or her household is a medical marijuana user.  This type of requirement, which would require an officer to provide private medical information regarding a family member, shows just how thorny the issues raised by this statute can get.

Whatever position that a department stakes out, police unions should demand to bargain before any medical marijuana policy is implemented.  Regardless of federal law, such a policy impacts on health care decisions by officers and potentially their families.  As such, the policies implicate terms and conditions of employment, and must be bargained before being implemented.  As always, Sandulli Grace stands ready to assist our clients to ensure that no policy is implemented that unnecessarily infringes on the rights of union members.

DLR Institutes New “Unilateral Settlement” Procedure

Taking a page from the NLRB’s playbook, the Massachusetts Department of Labor Relations (DLR) recently added another technique to their skill set: the “Unilateral Settlement.”  In a case involving the City of Newton and the Newton Municipal Employees Association, MUP-09-5694 (June 26, 2012) (here), the DLR, in the first known instance of which we are aware, approved a ‘settlement’ without the express approval on the record of one of the parties.  (It is not clear whether or to what extent the ‘non-approving’ party may have informally agreed behind the scenes.)

The settlement includes a financial award and a posting.  The posting does not acknowledge liability, but sets out the affirmative action the employer will take and contains a statement by the employer agreeing not to violate Chapter 150E.

According to the Commission’s decision, the Unilateral Settlement procedure was as follows:  (1) after a Complaint issued, the City and the Union attempted to mediate the Union’s unfair labor practice charge, to no avail; (2) the City then presented the DLR with the last offer it had given the Union and asked the DLR to accept the proposal and dismiss the case; (3) the DLR then reviewed the proposal and determined that it “remedie[d] the allegations in the Complaint” and therefore “further proceedings … would not effectuate the purposes of the Law; and (4) the DLR then withdrew the Complaint.

The DLR found support for this procedure in M.G.L. c. 150E, s. 11(b), which permits the DLR to dismiss charges when further proceedings would not effectuate the purposes of the Law, and 456 CMR 15.04(1), which allows the DLR to withdraw Complaints previously issued when a charging party does not make reasonable efforts to resolve a matter.

It is not clear to what extent the DLR will be utilizing this new procedure, but it appears to be a sign that the Department’s already-intensive focus on mediation is not reducing the caseload as much as DLR officials would like.  The new practice raises a couple of questions: (1) How different may the settlement proposal be from what the charging party would obtain if it went forward and won?  It is not clear from the Newton case materials whether the financial figure, for example, was discounted in any way.  (2) Also, as mentioned above, how much input, if any, do charging parties have into these settlements?  Are these settlements to be imposed on unwilling participants, or will there be ‘behind the scenes’ discussions to assure at least a modicum of acquiescence?  (3) What are the appeal rights of charging parties, if any, after the DLR withdraws a complaint pursuant to a “Unilateral Settlement”?

These and other issues will surely be answered in the coming months and years.  We will try to keep you informed of new developments as they arise.

Plymouth Superior Court Judge Uphold’s MTA Local Union’s Arbitration Victory

A judge of the Plymouth Superior Court has upheld an arbitration award in a matter involving the Marshfield Education Association, MTA/NEA, and the Marshfield School Committee, which ordered the School Committee to reinstate a teacher who had been terminated for lacking a proper license. (A copy of the decision is here.) The case was briefed and argued at Superior Court by John M. Becker, an attorney with Sandulli Grace, P.C.

The case involves special education teacher Gerard O’Sullivan, who struggled for several years to obtain the proper approvals that would allow him to obtain licensure. At the final stages, he was thwarted by school administration officials, whose misunderstanding of the requirements caused delays that ultimately caused him his job. Most frustrating was the School Department’s insistence that classroom experience could not count for any of the credits required for the license, a stance that was directly contradicted by the state’s regulations. Once Mr. O’Sullivan realized he was not going to have his license in time for the new school year, and the School Department’s attempt to obtain a waiver had failed, he asked for a leave of absence so he could get his license, but even that request was denied, and he lost his job.

The arbitrator saw through the Department’s failures and determined that Mr. O’Sullivan should not have been fired, that he should be reinstated and granted the one-year leave of absence to obtain his license. (The arbitrator pointed out that the School Department had actually employed Mr. Sullivan without a license for a full year when a waiver request had been delayed, so it rejected the idea that he was ‘automatically’ fired once his waiver expired.)

Despite the courts’ deference to labor arbitrators, the School Committee challenged the arbitration award in court, alleging that it forced the School Committee to violate state law and public policy by requiring it to employ a teacher without a license. In a 17-page decision issued on September 18, 2012, Judge Robert C. Cosgrove ruled in the Union’s favor on all the School Committee’s arguments. He found that by reinstating Mr. O’Sullivan to a non-teaching, leave of absence position, the arbitrator was not violating any law requiring teachers to be licensed. He also found that, even though there is a public policy requiring teachers to be licensed, this arbitration award did not violate the policy because it was designed to help the teacher obtain his license without requiring him to teach any students while unlicensed.

The School Committee filed a notice of appeal of the Superior Court’s decision last week, so the matter is not over yet. As usual, employers seem to have a problem with the concept of “final and binding” arbitration. Stay tuned to this site for further developments.

Masscop Member Wins Extra Detail Opportunities After Arbitrator Finds Contract Violation

The Town of Bellingham must provide a police officer who was out on administrative leave with additional paid detail opportunities after an arbitrator found that the Police Department’s practice of giving “refusals” to such officers violated the collective bargaining agreement between the Town and the police union, Local 216 of the Massachusetts Coalition of Police. The union was represented by Attorney John M. Becker of Sandulli Grace, P.C.

The issue arose when the Police Chief decided to place the officer on administrative leave so he could send him for a fitness-for-duty examination. During the month-long leave period, the Department, according to a longstanding practice, recorded the officer as having refused every detail opportunity that he would have been offered had he been working. Such refusals placed the officer much lower on the list when he did return.

The Department had adopted this practice for officers on sick, injury and administrative leave to keep officers who were out for long periods from returning at the top of the detail list. The problem, the Union argued (and Arbitrator John Cochran agreed in an August 28, 2012 award), was that the clear language of the collective bargaining agreement stated that refusals were only appropriate when an officer was actually available to take the work and voluntarily refused. Thus, the practice of the Department violated the unambiguous language of the contract, and in such cases, the arbitrator ruled, the contract, not the practice, prevails. As a remedy, Arbitrator Cochran ordered the Department to give the officer another detail opportunity for each refusal he received.

In another portion of the case, the Town had argued that the grievance was not arbitrable because the Union had not filed for arbitration until 10 months after the contract violation. In this case, the contract language required the Union to give notice of intent to arbitrate within 14 days but had no deadline for actually filing for arbitration. Arbitrator Cochran agreed with an earlier arbitrator, who ruled that despite the absence of a strict time limit, the Union must file for arbitration within a “reasonable time” unless it had a good excuse for the delay. In this case, Arbitrator Cochran found that 10 months was unreasonable “on its face” but that the Union had a legitimate reason for waiting to file. The Union had also filed an unfair labor practice at the state Department of Labor Relations in relation to the same underlying facts as the grievance, and a win at the DLR would have given the officer the remedy he was looking for. But when the DLR dismissed a portion of the case, the Union realized it would have to go forward with the grievance in order for the officer to be made whole. Based on this explanation, Arbitrator let the grievance go forward on the merits and ultimately ruled in the Union’s favor on the detail refusal issue.

Judge Strikes Parts of Wisconsin Collective Bargaining Law

A circuit court judge in Wisconsin struck down parts of the controversial law curbing collective bargaining rights on September 14, 2012.  The law, Wisconsin Acts 10 and 32, which was passed by the Legislature in March 2011, limited collective bargaining to wages only and further imposed a restriction that collectively bargained wage increases could not exceed the inflation rate.  Furthermore, the law prohibited collective “fair share” agreements in which all bargaining unit members pay a proportionate share toward collective bargaining; and imposed stringent certification requirements, among other restrictions.

In Madison Teachers Inc., et al. v. Scott Walker, et al., Dane County Circuit Court Judge Juan Colas held that the law violates both the Wisconsin and U.S. constitutions.  The case posits that although the law does not outright restrict the freedom of speech or association, two constitutionally protected rights, the law burdens the exercise of those rights.  For example, since the employees who choose to become members of the union are restricted from bargaining wages and further limited to how much they can seek, and those who do not join the union are not restricted, the law effectively burdens exercise of those constitutional protections by rewarding those who give up their free speech and freedom of association rights.  As such, the law also infringes upon the constitution’s equal protection clause by creating two classes of similarly situated employees (members and non-members of the union) who are treated differently and unequally.  The decision also invalidates the portion of the law that prohibits the City of Milwaukee from paying employees’ share of contributions to the City of Milwaukee Employee Retirement System.

The lawsuit’s plaintiffs are a teachers’ union and municipal employees’ unions as well as members of those unions; the defendants are Governor Scott Walker, who spearheaded the law six weeks after he took office, and the three members of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.  Since the decision was issued, public-sector unions have been trying to bargain new contracts in case the decision gets overturned.  The case is now pending before the Wisconsin appeals court.

The law spurred controversy since its inception.  All of Wisconsin’s Democratic senators boycotted a vote on the bill by fleeing the state.  After the bill was passed, protests erupted in Wisconsin and around the country and several other lawsuits have been filed concerning other portions of the legislation.  In June 2012, Governor Scott Walker survived a recall election, an initiative backed by labor unions.

 

 

Sandulli Grace and MCOP Protect the Collective Bargaining Rights of Sergeants

Sandulli Grace, P.C. and the Massachusetts Coalition of Police are litigating two ULP cases this fall for police sergeants who have been the targets of retaliation for exercising their protected speech rights as union members.

The first is Town of Mansfield and Mansfield Police Association, MCOP Local 298, MUP-11-6146, which is scheduled for hearing on September 25, 2012.  The Mansfield Police Association represents patrol officers and sergeants.  Sergeant Tracey Juda was assigned to investigate an incident in which a patrol officer under her command was accused of misconduct.  In the process of investigating the incident, Sergeant Juda advised the officer to contact his union representative, and gave him an opportunity to do so.  Chief of Police Arthur O’Neill presented her with a written reprimand accusing her of incompetence and excoriating her for acting as a “union friend” rather than a sergeant by advising the officer to seek union representation. Sergeant Juda’s union filed a charge of prohibited practice, and the Department of Labor Relations issued a complaint alleging that the Chief of Police had retaliated against Sergeant Juda for her protected activity. (A copy of the Complaint of Prohibited Practice and the union’s charge may be viewed here.)

The second case to appear this fall is City of Attleboro and Attleboro Police Association, MCOP Local 352, MUP-11-1161, which is scheduled for hearing on October 16, 2012.  The Attleboro Police Association represents patrol officers, sergeants, lieutenants and captains.  In February 2011, the City fired a police officer based on the statements of a fellow officer.  Chief of Police Kyle Heagney told the fellow officer that he should obtain the investigation report leading to the termination, and the fellow officer submitted a public records request through Sergeant Michael McDonnell.  Sergeant McDonnell, perceiving that the Chief was pitting union members against each other to weaken the union’s defense of the terminated officer, advised the union president of the public records request.  The Chief issued Sergeant McDonnell a scathing reprimand, accusing him of “disloyalty,” saying that the union should not have been informed of the public records request, and punishing him for trying to “provide the union with some kind of advantage.” Sergeant McDonnell’s union filed a charge, and the Department of Labor Relations issued a complaint alleging that Chief Heagney had discriminated against Sergeant McDonnell for engaging in concerted, protected activity, and interfered with his exercise of rights protected under the law.  (A copy of the Complaint of Prohibited Practice and the union’s charge may be viewed here.)  The APA has two other ULP charges pending based on retaliatory conduct by Chief Heagney.  Those charges are still in the investigatory stage.

Every police officer has the right to encourage fellow officers to seek union assistance.  These Department of Labor Relations decisions support our belief that sergeants and other supervisory police personnel are entitled to the same collective bargaining and protected speech rights as non-supervisory employees.  Sandulli Grace, P.C. and MCOP will continue to advocate for their rights.

 

Leigh Panettiere, Esq.

Sandulli Grace, P.C.

Salem Mayor Again Found To Violate Union Contract And State Law

City of Salem, Mayor Driscoll continues to disregard her legal obligations to the City of Salem employees and its Unions.  In March 2012 an arbitrator found that the City of Salem violated the Salem Police Superior Officers contract and past practice when Mayor Driscoll refused to pay a Police Captain, retiring after 30 years of service to the City’s Police Department for the earned benefits which all other retirees had received for over 25 years.  The Mayor again disregarded her legal obligations when she removed Police Sergeant Peter Gifford from the Harbormaster position which he had held since 2001 and replaced him with a civilian employee.  This was done without any bargaining with the Union as is required by state law.  On August 24, 2012, the second arbitrator found, that based on 10 years of past practice that “the Superior Officers’  ‘own’ the Harbormaster work and the Employer is constrained from unilaterally removing that work from the bargaining unit.”  The Arbitrator also stated that the “City violated the collective bargaining agreement and state law when it removed Sergeant Peter Gifford from the position of Harbormaster and replaced him with a civilian, non bargaining unit employee.”

Therefore twice in one year the Mayor has been found by an arbitrator to be in violation of her legal obligations to the working men and women of the City of Salem.  By disregarding her legal obligations and ignoring the rights of the employees, the Mayor has also compelled the Salem Police Superior Officers Association and the City of Salem to expend its resources to fight over its employees clear rights.  The mayor’s approach is clearly wrong and it is not working. Hopefully, the Mayor will finally learn to show the Union workers some respect and will act to meet her legal and contractual obligations.

The Salem Police Superior Officers Association is a Local of the Massachusetts Coalition of Police (MCOP) and is represented by Sandulli Grace Attorney Susan Horwitz.

Sandulli Grace Attorney Bryan Decker Wins Reinstatement for an Unjustly Terminated Boston Police Officer

Sandulli Grace Attorney Bryan Decker recently won reinstatement for an unjustly terminated Boston Police Officer.  In a case involving the City of Boston and the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, arbitrator Richard Boulanger ordered the immediate reinstatement with full back pay of Officer Baltazar DaRosa.  Arbitrator Boulanger found that the Boston Police Department did not have just cause to terminate Officer DaRosa in December 2010.  The Department charged DaRosa with involvement in a 2004 murder that occurred at a Cape Verdean Night at a night club in Randolph.  DaRosa’s cousin is the main suspect in the crime, of which DaRosa has steadfastly denied any knowledge.

Arbitrator Boulanger found that although the Department investigated the case for almost seven years, it produced no evidence that DaRosa knew of or was involved in the crime in any way.  He found that DaRosa did not violate any department rules justifying termination.  He ordered DaRosa reinstated and made whole – with full back pay and lost detail and overtime earnings.  You can read the Boston Globe’s article regarding the case here