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MTA Scores Major Victory For Marshfield Teacher

John Becker
John Becker February 3, 2014

The Massachusetts Appeals Court on January 30, 2014 affirmed an arbitrator’s award reinstating a public school teacher in Marshfield, Massachusetts.  (Read The Opinion)  The teacher was a member of the Marshfield Education Association (Union), an affiliate of the Massachusetts Teachers Association, NEA (MTA), which provided legal support.  The MTA assigned Patrick N. Bryant, formerly of Sandulli Grace, P.C., to represent the Union in the arbitration proceeding and appointed Sandulli Grace attorney John M. Becker to defend the Union when the School District appealed the arbitration award to the Superior Court and the Appeals Court.

The case had a long and tortuous history, but the key facts are as follows:  Marshfield special education teacher Gerard O’Sullivan had a teaching license when he began teaching in 2000, but like all teacher’s licenses, it expired after five years.  His attempt to obtain a new license met with delays, bureaucratic snafus, mixed messages from his employer and the state agency in charge (known by the acronym DESE), and deliberate misinformation (e.g., O’Sullivan’s School District told him that his six years of experience as a SPED teacher could not count towards his licensure, when the regulations clearly state otherwise).  During this period, however, O’Sullivan did work for at least three years with a license, which gave him professional teacher status (PTS) under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between his Union and the School Committee.  PTS provides certain benefits to teachers, including automatic renewal for each school year and a requirement that PTS teachers may only be discharged for cause after a hearing under the CBA and Mass. General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 42.

Despite his best efforts and the support of Union President Sarah T. Marples and MTA Consultant Joy Beckwith, O’Sullivan arrived at the end of the 2007-2008 school year with no license and no waiver from DESE.  Seeing few options, he invoked the CBA provision granting any teacher with at least six years of seniority an unpaid leave of up to one year, which would give him time to obtain his license.  But the School District denied the request, saying that absence of a license or a waiver made O’Sullivan automatically a non-employee by action of the law.  The School District said that it did not need to have a hearing, prove cause for discharge, or take any steps to end O’Sullivan’s employment because, without a license or a waiver, Mass. General Laws, Chapter 71, Section 38G automatically made him unemployed and unemployable as a teacher.

The Union grieved both the termination and the denial of unpaid leave, and the grievances proceeded to arbitration before Arbitrator Mary Ellen Shea.  Arbitrator Shea issued a 46-page award on September 15, 2010 ordering the School Committee to reinstate O’Sullivan’s employment and grant unpaid leave for the 2008-2009 school year.  She determined that O’Sullivan’s rights as a PTS teacher survived the loss of his license and he was entitled to CBA benefits such as unpaid leave.  Arbitrator Shea noted that (1) the School Committee’s argument that O’Sullivan was unemployable without a license was undermined by the fact that he continued to work as a teacher without a license or a waiver for long periods during his employment and (2) had the School District provided O’Sullivan with the due process to which he was entitled, the lack of a license would have provided adequate cause to discharge him.

Despite a CBA provision making arbitration awards final and binding, the School Committee appealed the award to Plymouth Superior Court on the grounds that it required the employer to violate the law and violated public policy.  Superior Court Judge Cosgrove rejected the School Committee’s arguments and confirmed the arbitration award on September 18, 2012.  The School Committee then appealed to a three-judge panel of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, which upheld the Superior Court ruling last week.  In summarizing its published opinion, the Appeals Court stated:

O’Sullivan’s unlicensed status alone did not automatically eliminate his rights, and … absent termination pursuant to §42, he retained certain collective bargaining rights, including the right to file a grievance and request an unpaid leave of absence. We also conclude that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in deciding that O’Sullivan was entitled under the CBA to the one-year unpaid leave of absence to try to fulfil his licensing requirements.

The School Committee has the right to seek further appellate review of the case by petitioning the Supreme Judicial Court.  Otherwise, according to the arbitrator’s award, the School Committee must reinstate Mr. O’Sullivan to his position and make him whole for any loss of pay and benefits.

 

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Sandulli Grace Attorney Stands Up For Retired Police Officers And Firefighters In Marlborough

John Becker
John Becker January 15, 2014

Sandulli Grace attorney Jamie Goodwin is at the forefront of the opposition to the Mayor of Marlborough’s outrageous proposal to cut health benefits for retired disabled police officers and firefighters.  Specifically, Mayor Arthur Vigeant asked the City Council to repeal its acceptance of Chapter 41, Section 100B of the Massachusetts Laws, which obligates the City of Marlborough to pay medical expenses for police officer and firefighters who retired due to a job-related disability.  The City adopted Section 100B in 1973, but now Mayor Vigeant says it is too expensive.  If the City repeals the law, the retirees would have to arrange for their individual health insurers to pay their medical expenses.  The Mayor’s proposal came before the City Council at a meeting on Monday, January 13, 2014, where several councilors immediately expressed their opposition.

Attorney Goodwin, who represents the Marlborough Police Command Officers Union, MassCOP Local 366, attended the City Council meeting in support of current and future retirees who would be affected, along with a number of union members, to express opposition to the proposal.  Attorney Goodwin was quoted in published accounts in both the Metrowest Daily News and the Marlborough Patch.  He pointed out to the Daily News that the City’s financial situation was not as dire as the Mayor stated, noting that the City had $28 million in excess levy capacity. In the Patch article, Attorney Goodwin pointed out that he was unaware of any other city or town that was proposing such a move.  “This shouldn’t even go to a council vote,” he said.
“At the end of the day, these guys go out and risk their lives,” Goodwin told the Daily News. “It’s a bad decision for Marlborough and a bad decision for the police and firefighters.”

 

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BOSTON CITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY VOTES TO FUND BOSTON POLICE PATROLMEN’S CONTRACT ARBITRATION AWARD

Sandulli Grace Staff December 4, 2013

The Boston City Council today voted 12-0 to fund Arbitrator Timothy Buckalew’s arbitration award covering the collective bargaining agreement between the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association and the City of Boston for 2010-2016. Read a copy of the Award here, and a copy of the arbitrator’s opinion here. Sandulli Grace is proud to have represented the BPPA in this proceeding.

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Waltham Police Conduct Informational Picket

Alan Shapiro
Alan Shapiro December 1, 2013

On Friday afternoon, the Waltham Police Patrol Officers and Superior Officers, both locals of the Massachusetts Coalition of Police, the largest police union in New England, held an informational picket at Waltham City Hall.  Their message was simple: after more than three years since the last contract expired and more than four years without a raise, we want a contract. Continue reading →

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High Court Awards Back Pay To Jail Officer, Ending 14-Year-Long Struggle

John Becker
John Becker November 20, 2013

It all began in December, 1999, when the Sheriff of Suffolk County wrongfully terminated a jail officer who, it claimed, failed to report two other jail officers for using excessive force on a prisoner.  After 14 years and half a dozen court decisions, the Jail Officers and Employees Association of Suffolk County (JOEASC), with the legal assistance of Attorney John M. Becker of Sandulli Grace, P.C., have finally succeeded in obtaining the officer’s back wages for all the years he was kept out of work.

The officer’s Union filed a grievance over his termination, which proceeded to arbitration in 2000.  In 2001, the Arbitrator found that the Sheriff did not have just cause for the termination and issued an award reducing the termination to a six-month suspension and reinstating the jail officer with back pay.  But instead of returning the officer to work, the Sheriff did what so many public employers do when confronted with an arbitration decision they don’t like – they appealed to court under G.L. c. 150C, § 11.  It was here, in the courts, that the officer’s ordeal truly began.  Because although the Union kept winning, the jail officer couldn’t go back to work.

First, the Sheriff asked the Superior Court to vacate the arbitrator’s award.  The parties filed briefs, the judge heard oral arguments and then, applying the rule that judges are supposed to be extremely deferential to labor arbitrators, the Superior Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision.  See Sheriff, County of Suffolk v. AFSCME, Council 93, AFL-CIO, Local 1134, 2002 WL 33966764 (Aug. 9, 2002) and 2002 WL 339966765 (Oct. 25, 2002).  Now it’s 2002.  Not satisfied, the Sheriff appealed the decision to the Appeals Court.  Once again, the parties filed briefs and the Court held oral arguments, after which the Appeals Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision upholding the arbitrator’s award.  See Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers and Employees of Suffolk County, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 915 (2004).  Now it’s 2004.

The Sheriff then asked the Supreme Judicial Court to review the case, arguing that the case deserved further appellate review because it involved “substantial reasons affecting the public interest or the interests of justice.” Mass. R. App. P. 27.1.  The SJC disagreed, but it did remand the case in light of its decision in City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 443 Mass. 813 (2005), which overturned an arbitration award because it violated public policy. So once again the parties filed briefs and argued before the Appeals Court, and once again the Appeals Court affirmed the arbitrator’s award.  See Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers and Employees of Suffolk County, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 903 (2007).  Now it’s 2007.  Again, the Sheriff asked the SJC to grant further appellate review and this time the SJC said yes.  So the parties went to the highest court in the Commonwealth to plead their case and, lo and behold, the SJC affirmed the arbitration award.  See Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of Suffolk County, 451 Mass. 698 (2008).  (For those keeping score at home, this is the fourth time a court has affirmed the arbitrator’s 2001 award.)

Finally, in August, 2008, the Sheriff allowed the long-suffering jail officer to go back to work and earn a regular paycheck.  But it was not over yet.  The Sheriff also owed the officer back pay for the 8 ½ years he was out of work.  So the Sheriff wrote up a list of the pay he would have earned, and subtracted certain items (unemployment compensation, for example) and asked the officer to sign off on the total, which he did.  But then the Sheriff decided that the officer might have earned more money while he was out of work and refused to pay anything.  The Sheriff refused to believe the officer’s statement that he never looked for another full-time job because he every time the case went to court, he won, and every time he won, he thought he was getting his job back.

JOEASC decided that this had gone on long enough and it asked its attorneys (Joe Sandulli and me) to take legal action.  Joe and I filed a motion for contempt in Superior Court on August 24, 2009 to force the Sheriff to pay.  The parties engaged in discovery and then went through a mini-trial on how much money the officer earned while waiting to go back to work.  The Superior Court judge ultimately agreed with the Union, and on April 12, 2011, he ordered the Sheriff to pay the amount based on the jail officer’s testimony.  The Sheriff, of course, could not accept this ruling, and went once again to the Appeals Court.  This time, the SJC, perhaps acknowledging the inevitable, took the case from the Appeals Court and heard it directly.  Once again, the parties filed briefs and, on February 4, 2013, argued before the seven justices of the SJC.  The legal issues before the Court were: (1) whether the jail officer had a duty to mitigate damages while out of work; (2) whether the Sheriff had waived the issue of mitigation; (3) whether the Sheriff had proved the jail officer had failed to mitigate; and (4) whether the Sheriff was subject to interest on the back pay award.  Ultimately the SJC ruled that the officer did have a duty to mitigate damages by looking for similar work but that: the Sheriff should have brought up the issue before the arbitrator and now it was too late; and even if the Sheriff didn’t waive the issue, it failed to show that there were similar jobs available for the officer to apply for.  The court also found that the Sheriff had sovereign immunity from interest awards.  See Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers and Employees of Suffolk County, 365 Mass. 584 (2013). .   Reading between the lines of the legal analysis, the takeaway from the SJC’s decision was that the Sheriff now – finally – had to pay the jail officer the back pay he was owed.  Now it’s 2013 – and  the damage that began with an improper termination in 1999 has finally been undone.  But has it, really?

From my perspective, there is something wrong with a system that allows, perhaps even encourages employers to challenge arbitration awards with such impunity.  First of all, to the extent that the monarchial-based doctrine of sovereign immunity has any lasting merit in today’s world, it should not apply to arbitration awards.  The failure to award interest means that public employers have little to lose by delaying reinstatement and back pay awards through fruitless appeals or other tactics.  The first goal of the interest doctrine is not to compensate those who have been deprived of the use of their money but to create an incentive for those with the obligation to pay to do so promptly.  Second, the Courts have been too willing to delve into the underlying merits of arbitration awards in recent years.  While reverentially reciting the deferential standard, the Courts’ analyses too often betray the presence of more hands-on standards like those used for administrative appeals under G.L. c. 30A.  As this former SJC law clerk can tell you, the standard of review is often where the case gets decided.  The implications for the entire labor arbitration system are serious.  Each arbitration award that is vacated because an arbitrator allegedly exceeded her authority or because the award violated public policy encourages other public employers to challenge the next loss (I say ‘employers’ deliberately because although unions have just as much right to appeal their losses, they very rarely do.).  In time, the words ‘final and binding’ in the collective bargaining agreements become more and more meaningless and ‘labor peace’ becomes something that is fought over by lawyers in the courts, instead of by the parties (and, yes, sometimes their lawyers) at the bargaining table.  And that would be a shame.

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Electronic surveillance of police under the Massachusetts Wiretapping Statute, M.G.L. c. 272 § 99

Sandulli Grace Staff October 25, 2013

Following a settlement in the Boston Police videotaping lawsuit last year[1], design and technology blog site Gizmodo.com posted an article designed to educate readers on legally (and safely) videotaping the police in public. Here’s the article: http://gizmodo.com/5900680/7-rules-for-recording-police.

While Gizmodo provides helpful information for anyone involved in one of these (ever-growing) encounters, the article definitely seeks to equip the “aspiring cop watcher” (see article) with the tools and knowledge to openly record police in an age where recording devices are readily available. This entry is geared more towards educating law enforcement here in the Commonwealth, both in protecting the rights of the police officer and preserving the rights of the citizen.

Overview of G.L. c. 272, § 99

M.G.L. c. 272, § 99 (“The Statute”), entitled “Interception of wire and oral communications,” is commonly referred to as the Wiretapping statute in Massachusetts. Because G.L. c. 272, § 99 imposes criminal sanctions, and is associated with the potential exercise of several constitutional rights, the statute has far-reaching effects in both the criminal and civil context. The relevant text of c. 272 § 99 reads as follows:

Any person who – willfully commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any other person to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an interception of any wire or oral communication shall be fined…

The operative word, ‘interception,’ means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such communication. G.L. c. 272, § 99(B)(4). The term ‘intercepting device’ is defined as “any device or apparatus which is capable of transmitting, receiving, amplifying, or recording a wire or oral communication.” G.L. c. 272, § 99(B)(3).

In 1968 the Legislature eliminated the so-called “one-party consent” aspect of the statute[2], thereby prohibiting all “secret recordings” by members of the public, including “recordings of police officers or other public officials interacting with members of the public.”[3] In so doing, the Legislature created what is considered a more restrictive electronic surveillance statute than the federal standard, as well as several other states.[4]

The Gizmodo article is misleading in stating that Massachusetts is one of 12 states that require the consent of all parties before someone records a conversation. As discussed below, a party need only have knowledge of the recording for it to be lawful; his or her consent is not required. This is an important distinction for law enforcement who are openly being recorded on-duty; just because you don’t consent to being recorded by an individual, does not mean you can stop the recording from happening or make an arrest.

Criminal consideration and relevant case-law

In the criminal context, a violation of the statute is classified as a felony, with a maximum penalty of five years in a state prison (or two and one-half years in a jail or house of correction).

The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the statute to penalize only “secret” use of electronic devices to hear or record the contents of a wire or oral communication with another.[5] In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 507 (1976), the Court held that an individual needs to have “actual knowledge” of a recording and that such knowledge can be shown where there are “clear and unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge.”

In applying the analysis undertaken in Jackson, the Court held that a criminal defendant did in fact violate the statute by recording an encounter with several police officers during a traffic stop, unbeknownst to the officers. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594 (2001). The significance of the Hyde opinion is that the Court (1) declined to carve out an exception for citizens to secretly record police officers during traffic stops, as police officers are just as entitled to the protection of the statute; and (2) that the Court stated that the “problem [in this case] could have been avoided if, at the outset of the traffic stop, the defendant simply informed the police of his intention to tape record the encounter, or even held the tape recorder in plain sight.” 434 Mass. 599-600, 605.

Constitutional consideration and relevant case-law

Interpreting the statute from a federal constitutional perspective, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that the filming or videotaping of police officers performing their responsibilities is protected by the First Amendment. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.)(2011). The plaintiff in Glik was arrested for using his cell phone’s digital video camera to film several police officers making an arrest on the Boston Common. 655 F.3d at 80. He was charged, among other things, with violating the Massachusetts Wiretap statute. Id.

After the trial court dismissed the count charging the plaintiff with violating the Wiretap statute (for lack of probable cause), he filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because “it is not well settled [the plaintiff] had a constitutional right to record the officers.” Id. The District Court denied the defendant’s motion, holding that the “First Amendment right publicly to record the activities of police officers on public business is established.” Id. The defendants appealed.

Though subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, the court held that an individual’s filming of the police engaged in official business is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 84. It furthermore held that the plaintiff’s actions here, which included audio and visual recording, “fell well within the bounds of the Constitution’s protections.” Id.

In addition, the court held that the plaintiff’s complaint (without deciding the ultimate merits of it) made out a proper allegation for a Fourth Amendment violation, as the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him under G.L. c. 272, § 99. Id. at 88. Interpreting the Massachusetts Wiretap statute, the court held the plaintiff’s recording was not “secret” within the meaning of the statute.[6] Id.

Implications

In light of Jackson and Hyde, the actions of a bystander in openly recording a police officer would not make out a criminal complaint for a Wiretap violation under G.L. 272 § 99. On the other hand, secretly recording an interaction with the police during a traffic stop, for example, would be a Wiretap violation.[7] While the law only requires actual knowledge as opposed to consent in order to be lawfully recorded, it offers more protection to law enforcement in that it prohibits all secret recordings, even those done in a crowded public place.

Another important consideration is that, subject to reasonable restrictions, a bystander who openly records a police officer in a public setting is not only (generally) safe from Wiretap prosecution, but is also engaged in a constitutionally protected activity.[8]

 

[1] Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir.) (2011), cited herein.

[2] Until 1968, the statute permitted the recording of one’s own conversations, or conversations with the prior permission of one party. See Hyde, infra.

[3] Commonwealth v. Hyde, 434 Mass. 594, 599-600 (2001).

[4] The majority of wiretapping statutes found elsewhere, including the federal standard, prohibit only the secretive recording of another’s words when spoken with a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See Hyde, supra at 599, fn. 5. As stated above, G.L. c. 272 § 99 prohibits “all secret recordings.” Id.

[5] The Court also interpreted “secret” as broader than just those situations where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Jackson, infra.

[6] As the plaintiff was recording the incident on his cell phone from about ten feet away, one officer stated “I think you have taken enough pictures,” to which the plaintiff replied “I am recording this.” Once it was established that the plaintiff was recording audio as well as visual, he was placed under arrest. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.

[7] See Hyde, supra.

[8] See Glik, supra.

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Town of Millbury and Millbury Police Association, MassCOP Local 128 – Termination of Kimberly Brothers

Sandulli Grace Staff September 5, 2013

On July 19, 2013, Arbitrator Timothy Buckalew reinstated Millbury Police Detective Kimberly Brothers, who terminated in August 2012 for allegedly “harassing” three residents of the Town.  Two women who had formerly dated Detective Brothers’ boyfriend, and one who had recently ended her friendship with Detective Brothers, accused Detective Brothers of either following them in a cruiser, or parking near their workplaces in order to intimidate them.

The Union, represented by Attorney Leigh Panettiere of Sandulli Grace, P.C., demonstrated at the arbitration that Det. Brothers, a busy and well-respected detective who before being promoted to detective was an extremely productive patrol officer, had been assigned to official police duties that often brought her near the homes and workplaces of the accusers.  The Union was also able to present numerous instances of inconsistencies and untruths in the testimony of the three accusers, and that the accusers were all talking to each other about Det. Brothers.  Additionally, the Union demonstrated that the investigator failed to inquire about any of the inconsistencies in the stories the accusers told.

The Arbitrator rejected the allegations of harassment.  He called the Town’s investigation “hasty and inadequate.”  He found that all three of the accusers were motivated to lie, and he found Det. Brothers to be “credible and consistent.”

The Town also accused Det. Brothers of “excessive texting,” clearly in an attempt to shore up the weak harassment allegations.  The Police Department had no policy on texting.  The Town never reviewed the text records of any other officer in the department, and did not even give Det. Brothers an opportunity to defend herself against this allegation during the investigation.  Moreover, the Union presented testimony of fellow officers and the Chief of Police that Det. Brothers did not text on duty any more than other officers in the department.  The Arbitrator credited the testimony of those witnesses, and stated, “the Town cannot not show excessive texting when it has no standard from which to argue the employee deviated.”

The Arbitrator delivered the Millbury Policy Association a resounding victory in this case, ordering Det. Brothers reinstated with full back pay and restoration of all benefits, including details and overtime.  Det. Brothers returned to her Detective position on August 26, 2013.  This is the third in a series of recent victories for the Millbury Police Association.  The Arbitrator’s Award in the Kim Brothers case can be read here.

 

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Attleboro Police Association, MassCOP Local 352 – Accidental Disability Retirement of Detective James Cote

Sandulli Grace Staff September 3, 2013

On November 2, 2010, Attleboro Police Detective James Cote, who was also President of the Attleboro Police Association, MassCOP Local 352, suffered a cardiac arrest in his home and was in critical condition for days.  MassCOP members throughout the state showed their support for Det. Cote and his family.  Det. Cote made an astounding recovery in the face of a prognosis of a mere 5% chance of survival.  However, he suffered memory loss from lack of oxygen.  While able to resume many of the activities of his daily life, Det. Cote was unable to continue his work as a police officer, and had to retire at the age of forty.

Det. Cote’s Union, represented by Leigh Panettiere of Sandulli Grace, P.C., assisted Det. Cote in filing an application for accidental disability retirement with the City of Attleboro Retirement Board, taking the position that Det. Cote’s cardiac arrest was work-related.  Det. Cote’s cardiologist diagnosed Det. Cote with a hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, usually an inherited condition.  Hypertrophic cardiomyopathy often causes sudden death in professional athletes, who appear completely healthy one moment but die of a sudden cardiac arrest the next.  One member of the medical panel believed that the existence of this so called “risk factor” exempted Det. Cote from the heart law presumption.

However, the Union was able to demonstrate through Police Department records and the testimony of Det. Cote’s fellow detectives that Det. Cote’s underlying heart condition had been exacerbated by the stress of a high-profile, high-pressure murder investigation that Det. Cote was spearheading up until the night before his cardiac arrest, and that, therefore, even if the heart law presumption did not apply, Det. Cote was entitled to an accidental disability retirement because his job had accelerated the condition.

Thanks to a well-written, thorough affidavit by Det. Cote’s cardiologist, a dedicated local Retirement Board willing to do the extra work necessary to understand the medical evidence, and the support of his Union and the Police Department, the Accidental Disability Retirement application was accepted by the Retirement Board, and it was approved by PERAC on June 27, 2013.

MassCOP and Attorney Panettiere were happy to be able to assist Det. Cote in the face of this daunting injury, and continue to send their good wishes to him and his family.

 

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Amendment To MGL C. 31 sec 58 Allowing Bargaining To Increase The 10 Mile Limit For Residency For Police And Firefighters Is In Effect

Sandulli Grace Staff August 21, 2013

This is in follow up to our blog post concerning the amendment of the civil service residency statute, MGL c. 31 sec 58.  Since this amendment was part of the State Budget and since the Budget has an emergency preamble, the amendment to 31 sec 58 was also effective immediately.  Therefore the amendment is in effect and it would be appropriate for a police and/or fire fighter unions in civil service communities to request bargaining with their municipal employers to increase the 10 mile residency requirement as the amendment allows.