All posts by Sandulli Grace Staff

Appeals Court Upholds Power of Arbitrators to Decide Whether a Teacher has Professional Teacher Status

Today, the Appeals Court issued a decision holding that arbitrators, acting pursuant to their authority under G.L. c. 71, § 42, have the authority to determine if a dismissed teacher held professional teacher status at the time of his/her dismissal. Under G.L. c. 71, § 42, teachers who have three consecutive years of service with a school district are entitled to professional teacher status, which confers upon them certain procedural and substantive rights, including the right to challenge their dismissals before an arbitrator under a just cause standard.

The case, Plymouth Public Schools vs. Education Association of Plymouth, involved a special education teacher, who worked for the school district for five years. During those five years, the teacher took maternity leave twice, under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). At the end of her fifth year, the school district notified her of its decision not to renew her for the upcoming year. The district believed that the teacher had not obtained professional teacher status because her service was interrupted by the two periods of maternity leave. The teacher and the union took the position that she had acquired professional teacher status by virtue of her five years as an employee of the school district. Accordingly, the union petitioned the Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education for arbitration. The Commissioner forwarded the petition to the American Arbitration Association for an arbitration to determine first, whether the teacher had professional teacher status, and, if she did, whether or not the district had just cause to terminate her employment.

The district filed suit in Superior Court. There, the district argued that the teacher did not have professional teacher status, that she had no right to arbitrate her dismissal, and that the question of whether or not she had professional teacher status could only be answered by the courts, rather than by an arbitrator. After the Superior Court ruled in the district’s favor, the teacher and the union appealed to the Appeals Court. The Appeals Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and declined to decide whether or not the teacher had professional teacher status. In doing so, the Court ruled that the question of whether or not she had professional teacher status was one appropriately answered by an arbitrator, rather than the courts. As a result, the dismissal will be reviewed by an arbitrator who will have the power to determine whether the teacher had professional teacher status and, if so, whether she was dismissed for just cause. Had the court not decided in the union’s favor, teachers in a similar position would have to file suit in court to determine their professional teacher status, and then, if the court ruled in their favor, proceed to arbitration to obtain a determination on the merits of their dismissal. This decision reaffirms the Legislature’s intent to have arbitrators decide issues relating to the termination of teachers and avoids forcing teachers into costly, duplicative litigation.

The case was successfully litigated by Atty. Matthew Jones of the Legal Services division of the Massachusetts Teachers Association.

Here is a link to the decision.

Public Records Law Overhauled For First Time In 43 Years

The state’s public records law was updated today for the first time in 43 years. The new law, “An Act to Improve Public Records,” puts pressure on municipalities and agencies to respond quickly and adequately to public record requests by establishing strict timeline requirements and allowing for significant judicial measures in the event of noncompliance.

Most notably, the law allows judges to award attorney fees and costs, as well as punitive damages up to $5,000 for a lack of good faith, to requesters who succeed in court against an agency or municipality that fails to produce records according to the statute. This change accompanies a new timeframe for responding to requests. Like the current law, the new law requires a response within 10 business days. However, the new law will require a municipality or agency, if it cannot produce the requested records, to identify a reasonable timeframe for turning them over. That timeframe cannot exceed 15 days for an agency and 25 days for a municipality following the initial receipt of the request, unless otherwise agreed to by the requestor.

Additional provisions call for the use of electronic and digital transmission of records when possible (preferably in ‘searchable’ form), the designation of one or more employees as ‘records access officers,’ and the creation of a Public Records Assistance Fund. Further, agencies must host websites providing records of proceedings, annual reports, winning bids for public contracts, grant awards, agency budgets, minutes of open meetings, and more.

The law specifically clarifies that personal information of law enforcement and public safety personnel, including their home address, personal email address, and home telephone number, “shall not be public records” and “shall not be disclosed,” with limited exceptions that include requests made by public employee organizations such as unions. Section 10B. Similar personal information relating to family members of law enforcement and public safety personnel are explicitly not public records and should never be disclosed, without exception. Id.

The bill, House No. H.4333, passed unanimously in both the House and Senate on Wednesday and signed today by the governor, after being formed as a result of a compromise between two bills originating separately in each chamber. Most of the provisions of the new law take effect on January 1, 2017.

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Reverses District Court’s “Deflategate” Decision, Reinstates Brady’s Suspension

By a 2-1 decision, a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned District Court Judge Richard Berman’s decision that overturned the NFL’s suspension of New England Patriots’ quarterback Tom Brady.

In its decision, the majority held that Judge Berman ignored the exceptional deference federal law afford decisions of labor arbitrators and acted beyond the narrow scope of review federal courts are required to adhere to. Specifically, the Court held that in suspending Brady, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell properly exercised the broad discretion given to him by Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement to suspend players for “conduct detrimental” to the NFL and/or the integrity of the game.

In its decision, the Court highlighted and rejected each of the three bases upon which Judge Berman overturned Brady’s suspension: 1) that Brady was not given proper notice that his actions could result in a four-game suspension, 2) that testimony excluded from the arbitration made the decision fundamentally unfair, and 3) that the NFL’s denial of access to the investigative notes from the NFL’s General Counsel also amounted to fundamental unfairness. In the case of each, the Court ruled that Judge Berman acted beyond his authority and did not afford Goodell’s decision the deference it was entitled to under the federal Labor Management Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court noted that under federal law, so long as the arbitrator is “even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority” the decision must be upheld, and that a judge cannot simply substitute his judgment for that of the arbitrator.

It is worth noting that the point of controversy which received a large bulk of the media attention in this case, that Goodell was able to serve as arbitrator in a dispute involving discipline he himself meted out, was a relatively minor issue to the Court. The Court that found this arrangement is extremely unusual, but noted that it was the process explicitly called for by the collective bargaining agreement. This is consistent with a long line of cases emphasizing that when parties to a collective bargaining agreement agree to a grievance process which ends in final and binding arbitration, that the decision of an arbitrator should be just that: final, binding, and free from interference by the courts. It seems that if the NFL and the NFL Players Association are to fix what many agree is a broken system of disciplinary appeals, they will have to do so at the bargaining table, rather than in a courthouse.

SJC Determines That State Pension Forfeiture Statute Is A Fine, Subject To The Eighth Amendment

The Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) is a fine and therefore subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment of the United States’ Constitution. Section 15(4) provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s pension and health insurance benefits if he/she is convicted of a crime relating to his/her position. The Court’s decision means that individuals convicted of minor crimes may not be subject to a complete forfeiture of their pension and retiree health insurance.

The case, Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission v. Bettencourt, involved, a lieutenant and twenty-five year veteran of the Peabody Police Department, who was convicted of twenty-one counts of unauthorized access of a computer system. Shortly after his conviction (which has since been appealed), the lieutenant applied for a superannuation retirement. However, as a result of the conviction, the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (“PERAC”) denied his application on the grounds that his retirement benefits and continuing health insurance were forfeited under G.L. c. 32, § 15(4). The issue before the Court was whether Section 15(4), as applied to this officer’s case, was an excessive fine under the Eight Amendment of the United States’ Constitution.

In determining that the forfeiture was an excessive fine, the Court held that Bettencourt had a property interest in his retirement benefits, that the forfeiture was a punishment (and hence, a fine), and that the fine as applied to him was disproportionate to the harm caused by the crimes for which he was convicted. As a result, the Court ruled that Section 15(4)’s forfeiture would not apply to Bettencourt’s pension and health insurance, allowing him to receive both in their entirety. Rather than determine what a non-excessive fine would be in this case, the Court deferred to the Legislature to determine how cases such as Bettencourt’s would be handled after forfeiture is deemed to be excessive.

This case is an important one, as the Court held for the first time that forfeiture under G.L. c. 32, § 15(4) is a fine subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment. While the case did not strike down Section 15(4), unless and until the Legislature answers the Court’s call to create a remedy for individuals who have been excessively fined under Section 15(4), excessive forfeitures should result in an employee receiving the entirety of their retirement and health insurances benefits.

You can find the case details here.

Appeals Court Upholds Arbitrator’s Award Reinstating Employee, Even Where Arbitrator Found He Sexually Harassed A Co-Worker

The Massachusetts Appeals Court today upheld an arbitrator’s reinstatement of a City of Springfield employee who was found to have sexually harassed a co-worker. The case is City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Unions, No. 15-P-742. The three judge panel, adhering to the high deference afforded an arbitrator’s decision, refused to find that the award violated public policy. The court found that while there is certainly a strong public policy against sexual harassment, the reinstatement of the grievant did not violate that public policy as he was still subject to remedial action for his behavior.

The grievant, a twenty-two year employee of the Springfield housing office with an “unblemished” record, was a messenger for the office. He suffers from “significant physical and mental health problems” and has a “mildly impaired overall [IQ] of 74.” He was fired over one incident, in which he made lewd statements and gestures toward a female employee, causing her significant upset. His union filed a grievance, and following a two day hearing, an arbitrator found that there was not just cause for the termination, and ordered him “reinstated to his position without loss of compensation or other rights.” The arbitrator found that the grievant’s conduct did amount to sexual harassment, but that termination was not justified. The arbitrator based her decision on the grievant’s work history, his physical and mental limitations, and also on the fact that another employee “engaged in a six-month course of sexual harassment directed at a co-worker” and received only a reprimand.

The City first claimed that the failure to uphold termination violates public policy. The court quickly rejected this, pointing out that employers are not required to terminate an employee who sexually harasses another employee, as long as other “appropriate remedial action” is taken. The City next claimed that the award violated public policy in that it ordered the grievant reinstated with no loss of compensation. The City argued that public policy required a sexual harasser to be punished in some way. The Court rejected this argument, noting that “counseling and training” are appropriate remedial responses to sexual harassment, and that the arbitrator’s award did not impede the employer’s right to require such. Again properly noting its limited role in review of an arbitrator, the panel noted that upholding the award “does not suggest that we agree with the arbitrator’s resolution of the matter without loss of compensation or other employment rights, as ‘even our strong disagreement with the result [would] not provide sufficient grounds for vacating the arbitrator’s award.”

The Court’s decision in this case again demonstrates that arbitrator’s awards are subject to great deference on review. Judges properly uphold such awards, even when they disagree with them, as the parties to an arbitration agreement have submitted to the “final and binding” nature of the process.

Read the decision.

The Daily Life Of A Policeman

In October 1969 the Boston Globe ran a five article series titled “The Daily Life of a Policeman.” The articles include interviews with members of the Boston Police Department, a psychiatrist, and policy pieces summarizing the problems facing the police, along with possible solutions. While these articles are fascinating because they provide a rare look into what it meant to be a police officer in Boston almost fifty years ago, they are also relevant because they describe many pressing problems and dilemmas that mirror many of the issues facing law enforcement today. We were lucky to get our hands on a copy of a pamphlet published by the Globe compiling these articles, and this blog will be a summary of its contents.

Part-1: Society’s New Scapegoat

This series begins with a narrative written from the perspective of an officer working the night shift responding to calls coming from across the city. For the officers working the night shift, it is a “nightmare of being incessantly alert, tense, ready for the unknown, the hidden, the madman, the criminal, the occasional accident, the desperate and the lonely.” While the incidents themselves, including street fights, fatal car accidents, and staring down the barrel of a shotgun at a domestic disturbance, are horrifying and dramatic, the most striking part of this article is the palpable anxiety caused by police work. Even on calls that seem routine, the author emphasizes the need to be ever alert to the unexpected, and the grave danger faced by the officers if they let their guard down for even a second. The author Daniel juxtaposes the rigors of the job with newspaper articles like, for example, “Ridicule, Low Prestige Blamed for Police Recruit Shortage” demeaning the profession. The drama of this article helps transition into the interviews that make up the majority of the series.

Part-2: You Always Know the Smell of Death

The second article in this series is an interview with 41 year old Patrolman Thomas B. Moran. Officer Moran, who was stationed at District 4 in the South End. The article begins with Officer Moran’s experience working the beat as a member of the department’s drug unit, including several vivid descriptions of the tragedy and danger he frequently encountered. The majority of the article, however, deals with psychological stress that comes with being a police officer, and Officer Moran’s thoughts regarding the relationship between the department and the public at that time. The Officer effectively described officer’s struggles with suppressing the human need to lash out at members of the public who attack them and describe them as “pigs” and “fascists” because of their professional obligation to hold themselves to a higher standard than the public. Before opining on the deteriorating conditions of the streets, the ineffectiveness of the prison system to rehabilitate offenders, and do-nothing politicians, Officer Moran stated “I said it before and I’ll say again. Nobody cares. This is the feeling of the police, that nobody cares one way or another.”

Part-3: The Pressures of the Job—Are They Too Great?

The next article includes an interview with Police Superintendent William Bradley. In this interview Juda discussed with Supt. Bradley how the stress of day-to-day police work takes a physical and mental toll on officers, and the need and demand for psychiatric care in the department. While the Superintendent expressed his strong faith in the exceptional maturity and mental strength of his officers, he described the need to make mental health care more accessible so that access to a psychiatrist would no longer be a “luxury” most officers could not afford. Balancing human needs and professional obligations also plays a role in this interview. According to the Superintendent, one of the hardest tasks asked of officers is to set aside his empathy and emotion when responding to tragedy in order to adequately perform necessary tasks like securing the scene and beginning an investigation. Although times change, the unique stresses of police work have not. As a result, police officer access to mental health care will likely always be an important issue.

Part-4: Mental Pressures Make Job Tougher

The last interview of the series is a conversation with Dr. Ruick Rolland, a psychiatrist in the Roxbury Court Clinic. At the outset of the interview, Dr. Rolland described the unique psychological stresses facing police officers, and the effect of those pressures on their performance. The theme of the doctor’s analysis is that officers respond to being overstretched but under appreciated by the public by becoming defensive and becoming apathetic towards their jobs and the people they serve. The Doctor warned that police departments facing an increasingly antagonistic public tend to become increasingly militarized, hampering their ability to work with, not against, the community. In the present era in which there is ever increasing tension between the police and the public, this last point still seems relevant today.

Part-5: Reforms Needed on Basic Problems

The last installment in this series include a list of the most pressing issues the author saw as facing the police department, and his solutions to remedy those problems. The biggest problems he identified are workplace complaints like lack of pay, long hours, the unresponsiveness of management and politicians, and the combativeness of the public. His direct reforms include increasing pay to attract better applicants, raising the prestige of the force, better access to mental health services, and giving officers a mechanism to voice their complaints about the force. Other indirect reforms include adequate facilities for helping alcoholics and drug addicts, better domestic violence protocols, and more money for rehabilitation programs in prison. The author takes an urgent tone in this final article, stressing the grave public safety implications of not implementing reforms as soon as possible. Despite the age of these pamphlets and the irrelevancy of some of the issues they contain, their main theme still holds true today: if society expects the police to effectively support them, the people, department, and politicians need to give them a certain amount of support and respect back.

Termination Upheld When Safety Violation Was Intentional And There Were Prior Disciplines

The Labor Arbitration Institute have arbitrators discuss hypothetical employment arbitration scenarios and state how he/she would have ruled. These “decisions” by arbitrators can be helpful in assessing how an arbitrator would rule in real world cases. In this scenario, a two-year employee rigged one of the two handles/levers on a press machine so that the machine would go faster and to alleviate some pain in his left arm that was hurting due to carpal tunnel syndrome. All five arbitrators on the panel would have upheld the discharge because the two levers were specifically there for safety reasons, the conduct was intentional, there was no prior request for an accommodation for carpel tunnel, he had prior discipline for other types of non-safety incidents, and the fact that the Company’s investigation may not have been 100% thorough was adequate enough.

What we can learn from the conclusions these arbitrators came to is that prior disciplines, even if they are for dissimilar conduct, can be used against you as progressive discipline, especially if it’s within a short span of time, and that relying on incomplete training or investigation as a basis for turning over a discipline/discharge comes up short in the face of other factors such as the ones discussed above.

Below is the complete discussion as issued by the Labor Arbitration Institute.

Conference Reporter – Labor Arbitration Institute

Safety Violation with a Poor Record

At this month’s program in Miami, the arbitrators on the panel discussed a case of a 2-year employee. He was a press operator. He had two years with the company, but had bid into a press operator position only 4 days earlier.

The press has two handles or levers. The reason for this is to ensure that the operator does not have either hand near the pinch point. In other words, the operator must use both hands at the same time in order for the press to work.

Four days into the job, the employee is discovered to have tied up the left-hand lever to a post. This allowed him to operate the press with just the right-hand lever. The supervisor asked him why he did this, and he gave two reasons. 1) he could work faster and thus, earn more incentive pay (true); and 2) his left arm was hurting due to carpal tunnel syndrome.

He was discharged for reasons which the panelists address below.

Decision

All five arbitrators on the panel would have upheld the discharge. What is interesting about this is how strongly they all felt, that:

1. There may not be a rule which specifically covers two levers, but the employer can rely upon its general safety rules.
The company went to the expense of providing two levers. These safety devices are there for a reason. The purpose of the device is to keep the employee out of harm’s way. The employee is jeopardizing his own safety.

2. It was intentional.
The union cited two prior cases in which employees were given a written warning. But in each case, the employees committed a one-time mistake. Both were the result of not thinking, and it doesn’t appear that either employee acted deliberately. On the other hand, the grievant did this for 3 days and it was intentional. In fact, is he cheating the other employees by gaining incentive pay that they cannot obtain the same way?

3. He didn’t ask for an accommodation.
He could have asked for an accommodation based on the carpal tunnel, but he didn’t.

4. He had a poor record.
He is a two-year employee, and he has this record: written warning for graphic statements to a supervisor and two written warnings & a 3-day suspension for attendance violations.

5. The Company investigation was adequate enough.
The union argued that the investigation should have included an interview of the trainer. Then, management would have learned that his training lasted only 15 minutes. The company counter-argued that the co-worker who trained him was only a few feet away on each of the 4 days that he worked, and thus available for any retraining. All of the arbitrators on the panel felt that an investigation does not have to be 100 percent. A lesser investigation will not nullify the discipline when the employer’s reasons for the discharge (#1-#4) are as strong as they are here.

Workers’ Compensation Recipients Not Required To Reimburse Employer From Settlement Proceeds Allocated To Pain And Suffering

Employees who receive workers’ compensation benefits may not sue their employers in tort.  G.L. c. 152 Sec. 24.  Employees may, however, file claims against third parties.  G.L. c. 152 Sec. 15.  If the employee recovers damages from the third party, the employer is entitled to a statutory lien on the recovery, unless the recovery is greater than the amount the insurer paid the employee.  In that case, the employee may keep the “excess,” which is defined as “the amount by which the gross sum received in payment for the injury exceeds the compensation paid under this chapter.”

In DiCarlo v. Suffolk Construction Co., decided by the SJC on Friday, an employer who had paid out workers’ compensation benefits to an injured employee was seeking a portion of the “pain and suffering” damages the employee received from a subcontractor whom the employee had sued in tort.  The damages arose from a settlement agreement.  The employee agreed to accept less money from the third party than he had received in total from the employer in workers’ compensation benefits, but the agreement specifically allocated a percentage of the payout to pain and suffering.  The employer argued that pain and suffering damages should be included in its lien.  The employer took the position that the “gross sum received in payment for the injury” included pain and suffering.

However, the SJC allowed the settlement agreement to carve out pain and suffering damages for the benefit of the employee.  The court held that the workers’ compensation statute does not allow an employer to be “reimbursed” for pain and suffering damages, because an employee cannot recover for pain and suffering under the workers’ compensation statute – only for wages.  The court clarified that an insurer “cannot be reimbursed for something that it did not pay.”  The decision can be read here.

Department Cannot Refuse To Reinstate Officer After Arbitrator Determines Shooting Was Justified

Late last year the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the reinstatement of a Portland Police Officer, rejecting the city’s attempt to negate an arbitrator’s order under the guise of “public policy.” The case Portland Police Ass’n v. City of Portland arose out of the 2010 shooting death of a man named Aaron Campbell by an Officer Frashour. While responding to a disturbance at Mr. Campbell’s house, Officer Frashour fatally wounded the man, mistakenly believing the decedent was reaching for a gun in his waistband.

Portland’s police chief fired the officer in response to the incident after determining Officer Frashour had violated the city’s physical and deadly force policies. The Portland Police Association grieved the termination and, after a 16 day hearing, an arbitrator found Officer Frashour’s actions to be reasonable and ordered his reinstatement to the force. Despite this exoneration, the city refused to reinstate the officer. At the union’s appeal to the Employment Relations Board, the City contended that the award was unenforceable under ORS 243.706(1), which reads, in relevant parts; “as a condition of enforceability, any arbitration award that orders the reinstatement of a public employee . . . shall comply with public policy requirements . . . including but not limited to policies respecting . . . unjustified and egregious use of physical or deadly force.” In short, it was Portland’s position that the arbitrator did not have the authority to reinstate an officer who had violated the city’s stated public policy goal of preventing the unnecessary use of force by police.

The Board rejected the city’s position, finding that, because the arbitrator determined Officer Frashour was not guilty of the conduct for which he was disciplined, the statute was inapplicable. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Board’s determination that the statute only applies when an arbitrator finds an officer violated the city’s use of force policy, but nonetheless elects to alter the employer’s disciplinary decision. Essentially, because the city agreed to resolve certain labor disputes through binding arbitration, it could not overturn the arbitrator’s findings of fact regarding just cause simply because it disagreed with the arbitrator. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals’ decision supports the sanctity of arbitrator’s findings and emphasizes to public employers that they cannot play judge, jury, and executioner when it comes to employee discipline.

The full text of the case can be read here: http://cases.justia.com/oregon/court-of-appeals/2015-a152657.pdf?ts=1451492107

Sandulli Grace And The Massachusetts Coalition Of Police Win Night Shift Differential Pay For The Community Service Officers In The Braintree Police Officers Association

In contract negotiations between the Town of Braintree and the Braintree Police Officers Association, MCOP Local 365, the Town proposed the new position of Community Service Officer (CSO).  The Town proposed the CSO as a specialty position that could be filled without regard to seniority, an exception to the usual practice. The Town also proposed to “flex” the officers’ schedules, which meant that the officers would only receive overtime if they actually worked more than eight hours in a day – not if they were required to work an entirely different shift because of the needs of the job.

The contract language did not specify how the CSOs would be compensated.   However, the Town agreed that the CSOs would work a flexible schedule “in the same fashion as currently worked by the Narcotics Unit.” This was sufficient to convince the union to agree to the proposal, because the narcotics detectives worked a flexible schedule, and were paid the night shift differential all the time. The night shift differential made up for the negative aspects of the position, and “sold” the proposal to the union.

Once the position was filled, however, the Town refused to pay the CSOs the night shift differential, taking the position that it was not required to do so because the pay rate was not stated in the contract. The union filed for arbitration. On January 20, 2016, the arbitrator issued his award, agreeing with the Union and ordering the Town to pay CSOs the nights shift differential. (The award can be viewed here.)

This is an important victory for the Massachusetts Coalition of Police and the Braintree Police Officers Association. The arbitrator acknowledged that, by agreeing to a specialty position which the Chief could fill without regard to seniority, the union was obviously making a concession, and it would not be reasonable to expect the union to do so without getting something in return. In this case, what the union expected to get in return was the night shift differential. The arbitrator, Timothy Buckalew, showed great respect for the challenges of police collective bargaining. It was a hard-fought and well deserved victory, and I congratulate the Braintree Police Officers Association!